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 Reconsidering Spousal Privileges after Crawford 
 
         © R. Michael Cassidy* 
 
[Forthcoming, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW] 
 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision Crawford v. Washington1 has revitalized the 
Confrontation Clause in criminal proceedings by restricting the government’s use of 
hearsay evidence where the out-of-court declarant does not testify at trial.  It has lead 
increasingly to circumstances where criminal defendants are able to exclude out-of-court 
statements which would previously have been admitted under firmly rooted exceptions to 
the hearsay rules.2  This sudden shift in the relationship between state evidentiary rules 
and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause has lead to confusion and uncertainty 
for prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges.  While the fallout from Crawford has been 
dramatic, it has been felt most acutely in area of domestic violence prosecutions, due to 
the frequent  unwillingness of such victims to testify against batterers with whom they 
share an intimate relationship.3   
 
 To date, Crawford has generated calls in the academic community for increasing 
preliminary examinations of victims in domestic violence cases so that hearsay will be 
admissible at trial should the witness later become unavailable to testify;4  for dedicating 
judicial and prosecutorial resources to specialized domestic violence courts so that these 
types of cases may be tried more expeditiously—before the victim is coerced or induced 
to recant;5 and, for improving the provision of witness protection services prior to trial.6  
Surprisingly, little academic attention has been paid to the root cause of witness 
unavailability in domestic violence cases; that is, state spousal privilege statutes.  In this 
article, I will argue that state legislatures should reconsider their spousal privilege rules—
many of which are poorly conceived, confusing, and outdated—and should reform these 
statutes in light of Crawford to add an express exception for criminal cases alleging 
domestic violence. 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Notre 
Dame.  I am indebted to my colleagues Mark Brodin and Phyllis Goldfarb for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft, and to my students Genevieve Byrne, Robert Frederickson and Scott Semple for their diligent 
and competent research assistance. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford , 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 755 (2005). 
3 Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and 
Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 312 (2005).  “Crawford  has disrupted domestic violence 
prosecutions to a degree not seen in any other area.”  Robert P. Mosteller, Encouraging and Insuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses,  39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 607 (2005). 
4 Lininger, supra  note 2, at 789; Mosteller, supra  note 3, at 609–10.  
5 Raeder, supra  note 3, at 315. 
6 Lininger, supra  note 2, at 814. 
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 In Part I of this article I analyze the Crawford decision and the Supreme Court’s 
“new” Confrontation Clause analysis, including the Court’s recent post-Crawford 
decisions in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.7  In 
Part II, I assess the pervasive and adverse impact Crawford has had on state domestic 
violence prosecutions.  Part III of the article explores the historical purposes and policies 
underlying the marital privileges, including both testimonial disqualification rules and 
privileges for confidential communications.  In Part IV of the article, I survey marital 
privilege statutes throughout the fifty United States, pinpointing doctrinal weaknesses 
and current areas of confusion nationwide.  In the final section I propose reforms that 
would decrease the incidence of witness unavailability in domestic violence cases, 
thereby empowering law enforcement to more effectively combat this highly pernicious 
form of crime. 
 
 
II.  Crawford:  Shifting the Constitutional Landscape  
   
 In Crawford v. Washington,8 the Supreme Court considered whether the 
prosecution’s use at a criminal trial of a witness’ tape recorded statement to the police 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to “be confronted with” the witnesses 
against him.9  Defendant Michael Crawford was charged with first degree assault and 
attempted murder for allegedly stabbing the victim with a knife.10  The alleged motive 
was that the defendant believed the victim had previously sexually assaulted Crawford’s 
wife.11  Both Crawford and his wife were arrested following the fracas, and both gave 
statements upon questioning by police and following Miranda warnings.  Mrs. 
Crawford’s recorded statement implicated her husband, because it cast doubt on Mr. 
Crawford’s claim tha t the victim possessed a weapon and that Crawford was acting in 
self defense.12  Mrs. Crawford’s statement also implicated herself as an accomplice, 
because she acknowledged informing her husband about the sexual assault and leading 
her husband to the victim’s apartment.  Mrs. Crawford was excused from testifying at 
trial on the ground of the state marital privilege.13  The trial court admitted Mrs. 
Crawford’s tape recorded statement to the police under the state of Washington’s hearsay 
exception for declarations against interest.14   
 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia ruled that the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated by the admission of this tape recording. 15  Engaging in a 
lengthy historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia noted that “the 
                                                 
7 126 S.Ct. 2266, __U.S. __ (2006). 
8 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
9 Id. at 54–56.  The Sixth Amendment was incorporated and made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).  
10 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 40.   
11 Id. at 38. 
12 Id. at 39. 
13 Id. at 40. 
14 Id. at 40 (citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)). 
15 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
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principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil- law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations [by magistrates] as 
evidence against the accused.”16  The Confrontation Clause reflects the Framer’s “acute” 
concern in 1791 about a particular type of out-of-court statement; that is, one that 
“bear(s) testimony,”17 such as where a witness was examined “in private by judicial 
officers” in the continental civil law tradition. 18  According to Justice Scalia, “testimony” 
is “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact.”19  The Court concluded that except where the Confrontation Clause right has 
been forfeited by the defendant,20 out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” in nature 
may not be admitted in criminal cases over defendant’s objection unless 1) the declarant 
is deemed unavailable to testify at trial, and 2) the defendant has some prior opportunity 
to cross examine the declarant.21   
 
 The Court in Crawford was unable or unwilling to agree on a precise formulation 
of a “testimonial” statement, most likely due to the practical difficulty of obtaining a 
majority of justices to support any single definition. 22  Justice Scalia discussed three 
possible definitions:  1) the functional equivalent of ex parte testimony; that is, “material 
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 
to cross examine, or similar pre-trial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 
to be used prosecutorially;”23  2) “extrajudicial statements…contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;”24 
and 3) “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”25  The Court declined to settle on one comprehensive definition of testimonial 
                                                 
16 Id. at 43.   
17 Id. at 36, 50. 
18 Id. at 43. 
19 Id. at 51. 
20 The Supreme Court in Crawford recognized the doctrine that a party who procures the non-attendance of 
a witness at trial cannot raise a constitutional objection to his inability to confront that witness.  Id. at 62 
(“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing … extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds.”) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)).  The Court in Davis expanded 
on this dicta somewhat by citing with approval decisions by state and federal courts that impose the burden 
on the government to prove forfeiture by a preponderance of evidence, and that allow for the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence in such preliminary proceedings. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).  
While a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing might be raised with increasing frequency in domestic violence 
cases after Crawford where the government has evidence that the defendant affirmatively intimidated the 
victim to get her to recant or refuse to cooperate, the subject of forfeiture is beyond the scope of this article.  
See generally Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence:  The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in 
Light of Crawford  v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 253 (2005). It is ironic, however, that the Court 
in Davis cited the hearsay exception for “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) as 
evidence that such an exception should be recognized in Confrontation Clause cases, 126 S.Ct. at 2280, 
when the Court  in Crawford  had explicitly decoupled hearsay rules from Sixth Amendment protections on 
the ground that these two doctrines serve different purposes.  Crawford , 541 U.S. at 62–64. 
21 Davis, 126 S.Ct at 1365. 
22 See Raeder, supra  note 3, at 320.   
23Crawford , 541 U.S. at 51–52 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 23). 
24 Id (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
25 Id. (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae at 3).   
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hearsay,26 instead ruling that Mrs. Crawford’s tape recorded, post-arrest statement to the 
police fell within the common core of all three tests proposed by the court.27 The Court 
stated that at a minimum the term applies “to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police interrogations.  These are the 
modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed.”28  The Court similarly declined to define “police interrogations,” the 
product of which was construed to be within even the narrowest definition of 
testimonial.29   
 
 Crawford transformed overnight the landscape of criminal practice.  Under the 
court’s earlier Confrontation Clause analysis of Ohio v. Roberts,30 the hearsay rule and 
the Confrontation Clause were considered closely aligned and intended to protect the 
same value:  that is, the reliability of the statement.  So long as hearsay met a firmly 
rooted exception to the hearsay rule or harbored particular guarantees of trustworthiness, 
its admission in a criminal case did not offend constitutional protections for the 
accused.31  After Crawford, however, hearsay and confrontation rights have been 
decoupled.32  Where hearsay is considered “testimonial” it may not be admitted at trial 
even if it meets an established and long-standing hearsay exception or is otherwise 
reliable,33 unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant previously had an 
opportunity to cross examine him.34  According to Justice Scalia, the Confrontation 
                                                 
26 The Court cited works by Akil Amar and Richard Friedman, two constitutional scholars who have long 
advocated that a testimonial approach is more consistent with the historical purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id. at 61.  These scholars have taken radically different approaches to the question of how the term 
testimonial should be defined.  See Akhil Reed A mar, Confrontation Clause First Principles:  A Reply to 
Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L. J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (arguing that testimony should be construed in a 
narrow sense, encompassing “those witnesses who testify either by taking the stand in person or via 
government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like.”); Richard D. Friedman & Bridget 
McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1240–01 (2002) (urging a broader definition that 
would include any statement “made in circumstances in which a reasonable person would realize that it 
likely would be used in investigation or prosecution of a crime”).  
27 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68. 
28 Id. at 68. 
29 Id. at 52.  “[Mrs. Crawford’s] recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies [as a “police interrogation”] under any conceivable definition.”  Id. at 54n.4.  In 
Crawford, the Court cited Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980), in support of a colloquial rather 
than formalistic approach to defining interrogation.   Id.  In Innis, the Court stated that interrogation for the 
purposes of Miranda extends “not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part 
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”  Innis, 446 U.S. at  292. 
30 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
31 Id. at 66. 
32 See id. at 66 (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”). 
33 The one possible exception to this new rule is dying declarations, which Justice Scalia recognized were 
admitted at common law even prior to the enactment of the Sixth Amendment. Crawford , 541 U.S. at 56 
n.6 (“Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those 
that clearly are . . . .  If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
34   Although not entirely clear from the Court’s opinion in Crawford , it does not even appear that the cross 
examination must have covered the same subject matter referenced in the hearsay statement.   Cf. People v. 
Sharp, 825 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill. App. 2005) (admitting prior statement even though defense counsel stayed 
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Clause was designed to guarantee the procedural protection of cross examination, and not 
the substantive reliability of the statement.35    Where testimonial hearsay is at issue,36  
the Court concluded that no assurances of reliability can substitute for the defendant’s 
“bedrock” right to confront his accuser.37    
 
Commentators, practitioners, and even Justice Rehnquist in his Crawford 
concurrence38 lamented the many important questions left unanswered by the Supreme 
Court.  The three most notable areas of confusion are:  1) what definition of “testimonial” 
lower courts should follow; 2) what constitutes a police “interrogation,” response to 
which the Court considered to be within even the narrowest definition of testimonial 
hearsay; and 3) when is a witness considered “unavailable” within the meaning of 
Crawford, such that the government may be permitted to introduce hearsay if the witness 
had previously been cross-examined by the defendant.39    
 
With dramatic implications for domestic violence prosecutions, the Court also left 
unresolved the critical issue of whether and when excited utterances will be considered 
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  Crawford involved testimony 
                                                                                                                                                 
away from subject matter on cross examination at trial of child victim, where child was unable to recount 
abuse). 
35 Id. at 61 (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner:  by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”) 
36 Where the state seeks to admit non-testimonial hearsay against the defendant in a criminal case, the Court 
in Crawford left open the possibility that the Confrontation Clause provides no protections whatsoever.  An 
example of non-testimonial hearsay is a casual, off hand overheard remark, such as an excited utterance or 
a present sense impression made by the declarant to another civilian, which may be admitted under state 
and federal evidentiary hearsay exceptions.  See id. at 51 (“Where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is 
wholly consistent with the Framer’s design to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay 
law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether.”).  Thus, the Supreme Court in Crawford did not expressly overrule Roberts as applied 
to nontestimonial hearsay; however, this was likely a tactic designed to avoid an issue not presented that 
may have put the majority at risk of losing votes.   Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion that 
the Court in Crawford had “of course overrule[d]” Ohio v. Roberts.  Id. at  75.   In Davis the Court put this 
issue to rest by ruling definitively that Ohio v. Roberts has no continued vitality with respect to 
nontestimonial hearsay, and that the Confrontation Clause poses no bar to its admission.  “We must decide, 
therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay.”  Davis v. Washington , 
126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274. “The answer to [this] question was suggested in Crawford , even if not explicitly held 
. . . A limitation [directed at ‘bearing testimony’] so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional 
provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.” Id.  
37 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 42. 
38 Id. at 69–70. 
39 While the Crawford  court declined to define “unavailability,” it  cited Barber v. Page, for the proposition 
that even where the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross examine a witness at a preliminary 
hearing, the trial judge must nevertheless exclude this prior testimony where the government has not 
established the unavailability of the witness at trial.  390 U.S. 719 (1968).  In Barber, the prosecutor had 
not made any attempt to file a detainer seeking the transfer of a federal prisoner in order to have him testify 
in a state armed robbery trial.  Id. Instead, the government simply introduced a copy of the prisoner’s 
testimony at a preliminary hearing.  According to the Barber Court, “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for 
purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities 
have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.”  Id. at 725.  What constitutes a “good faith 
effort” to secure the attendance of the witness for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis will have to be 
decided by future cases.  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804 (a)(5). 
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admitted under a state exception for declarations against interest.  The exception for 
excited utterances was not directly at issue in the case.  However, the majority in 
Crawford stated that the Court’s new Sixth Amendment analysis “cast doubt”40 on its 
prior holding in White v. Illinois.41  In White, the Court had ruled that an excited utterance 
made by a four-year-old child to an investigating police officer in her home shortly after 
an alleged sexual attack were admissible in a state prosecution notwithstanding the 
Confrontation Clause because the statement came within a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule.42  According to Justice Scalia in Crawford, the White decision was 
“arguably in tension” with the new rule requiring prior opportunity to cross examine 
testimonial statements.43  Clearly, the Court believed that some excited utterances would 
be considered testimonial within the new Crawford framework, but it declined to 
elaborate on which forms of such utterances must be excluded and which will be 
admissible when the declarant does not testify.  
 
 Two cases consolidated by the Court and decided at the end of the 2005-2006 
term clarified this latter issue—but only somewhat.44  In Hammon v. Indiana,45 the Court 
reversed the defendant’s conviction for domestic battery where the victim was 
subpoenaed to testify but failed to appear at trial.  The prosecutor offered in evidence 
through a police witness both the victim’s hearsay statement to police officer upon 
arriving at the scene and a signed battery affidavit that the victim completed shortly after 
the incident.46  The trial court admitted these statements under a state hearsay exception 
for excited utterances, notwithstanding the defendant’s objection on Confrontation Clause 
grounds.47  The Supreme Court ruled that these statements were the product of a police 
“interrogation” and thus fell within the core class of testimonial hearsay described in 
Crawford.  The Court believed that the victim’s oral and written statements to the police 
officer at the scene were testimonial because there was no emergency in progress when 
the police arrived at the scene; the alleged fracas was over, the victim stated that she was 
“fine,” and both parties were separated with a view toward determining how potentially 
past criminal acts had progressed.48  The Court viewed this conversation as similar to the 
interrogation of the alleged co-venturer in Crawford, even though it lacked the formality 
of a stationhouse setting and Miranda warnings.49   
 
                                                 
40 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
41 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
42 Id. at 350.  The trial court in White admitted these statements under the state “spontaneous declaration 
exception,” defined in Illinois as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Id (citing People v. White, 555 
N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. App. 1990)). 
43 Id. at 58 n.8.   
44 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).   
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2272. 
47 Id.  While the trial court admitted the victim’s oral statement to the police as an excited utterance and her 
affidavit as a present sense impression, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that only the first hearsay 
exception applied to these out of court statements.   Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ind. 2005), 
rev’d, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
48 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278–79. 
49 Id. at 2278. 
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In the consolidated case of Davis v. Washington, the Court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction for felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, where the 
victim did not testify at trial and the prosecution instead introduced the victim’s tape 
recorded telephone call to a 911 dispatcher identifying her attacker and asking for help.50  
The trial court, over the defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection, admitted this 911 
tape as an excited utterance.51  The Supreme Court ruled that this conversation was not a 
police “interrogation” because it was taken primarily for the purpose of meeting an 
ongoing emergency which was in progress, rather than to gather evidence of a past act.52 
The Court in Davis recognized that “‘[o]fficers called to investigate [domestic violence 
disputes] need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the 
threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.’  Such exigencies 
may often mean that ‘initial inquires’ produce nontestimonial statements.”53  
 
The Court in Davis once again refused to adopt a precise definition of 
“testimonial.”  It did, however, clarify when police questioning rises to the level of an 
“interrogation” such that civilian responses will be considered testimonial even within the 
narrowest possible definition of that latter term.  The Court adopted the following test:   
 
[Statements made in response to police questioning] are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 54  
 
 The Court instructed lower courts to look for the “primary purpose” of the police 
officer’s inquiry, and to make this determination objectively based on the apparent 
purpose served by the questioning rather than by inquiring into the subjective intent of 
either the speaker or the listener.55  Justice Thomas, concurring in the result in Davis and 
dissenting in Hammon, criticized Scalia’s “primary purpose” test as unworkable and 
unpredictable.  “In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, 
whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an 
interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the 
emergency situation and to gather evidence.”56  Thomas would have preferred that the 
Court adhere to the narrow test of testimonial which he had first proposed in White, 
limiting application of the Confrontation Clause to “formalized testimonial materials” 
such as ”affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”57 
 
                                                 
50 Id. at 2271. 
51 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005), rev’d 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).  
52 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2276–77 (“Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative 
report of a crime absent any imminent danger, [the victim’s] call was plainly a call for help against bona 
fide physical threat….She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying.”). 
53 Id. at 2279 (citing Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). 
54 Id. at 2273.  
55 Id. at 2277–2278n.5.   
56 Id. at 2283. 
57 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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While it is clear from Davis that not all excited utterances made by victims to 911 
dispatchers or to police officers responding to the scene of a crime will be considered 
“testimonial,” some certainly will be.  “Calls for help”58 during 911 calls and “initial 
inquiries”59 when police respond to the scene will not considered testimonial where there 
is an ongoing medical or public safety emergency and the police are trying to render aid 
or impose order.  According to the Court, when the police are responding to an 
emergency and they ask preliminary questions to ascertain whether the victim, other 
civilians, or the police themselves are in danger; they are not obtaining information for 
the purpose of making a case against a suspect, and therefore the ensuing statements are 
non- testimonial. 60   But responses to further questioning by the same police officer after 
the cause and circumstances of the emergency have been clarified may be considered 
testimonial.   The Court in Davis clearly noted that some victim statements may contain 
both non-testimonial portions and testimonial portions; that is, initial segments of a 
statements may be considered non-testimonial because primarily evoked for the purpose 
of securing help in an emergency situation, but as the conversation continues the focus of 
the inquiry may shift from providing medical assistance to gathering evidence of a past 
criminal act.61  Where the victim is unavailable to testify at trial, to protect the 
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause such mixed statements must be 
redacted and only the non-testimonial portion of the excited utterance may be admitted.62   
 
 
III.   Impact of Crawford on Domestic Violence Prosecutions  
   
 Findings by the U.S. Surgeon General reveal that battery by intimates (spouses or 
lovers) is the single largest cause of physical injury to women in the United States.63  The 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates approximately two million 
injuries and 1,300 deaths can be attributed to intimate partner violence in the United 
States each year.64  Roughly one out of every three women in this country will be victims 
of domestic  violence during their lifetimes.65   It is not an overstatement to suggest that 
our country is fighting a national epidemic of this form of abuse.66   
 
                                                 
58 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2276. 
59 Id. at 2279. 
60 Id. at 2277. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY, 46, 46 (1992). 
64 John C. Nelson, Ronald B. Adrine, Elaine Alpert, Sara Buel & Corrine Graffunder, Domestic Violence in 
the Adult Years, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 29 (2005). 
65 KAREN SCOTT COLLINS, CATHY SCHOEN, SUSAN JOSEPH, LISA DUCHON, ELISABETH SIMANTOV & 
MICHELE YELLOWITZ, HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN’S LIFESPAN:  THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 
1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN’S HEALTH 15 (May, 1999), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Healthconcerns__surveyreport.pdf.  
66  Percival, supra  note 20, at 234. 
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 Over eighty percent of domestic violence victims are noncooperative with law 
enforcement following the ir initial allegations of abuse.67  Justice Scalia in Davis 
recognized that “[t]his particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation 
or coercion of the victim to insure that she does not testify at trial.”68  An “all too 
familiar” scenario in domestic violence prosecutions is that the victim calls the police, the 
police show up at the marital home where the victim reports a battery, the alleged 
perpetrator is arrested, and thereafter the victim fails to show up for trial, or appears and 
recants.69  Experts have identified four psychological factors that contribute to the 
uniquely high incidence of noncooperation by domestic violence victims compared to 
other types of prosecutions :  1) the victim fears retaliation from her70 abuser; 2) the 
victim fears that children of the relationship will be taken away from her or otherwise 
adversely effected by criminal proceedings ; 3) the victim is economically dependent on 
her abuser and is concerned about the family’s ability to support itself should the abuser 
be incarcerated; and, 4) repeated cycles of abuse and reconciliation over time have caused 
the victim to internalize feelings of low self esteem, learned helplessness, and even 
personal responsibility for her own abuse.71     
 
In light of these obstacles, prosecutors have developed several strategies over the 
last decade to combat domestic violence.  These strategies include “no drop” policies and 
so called “evidence based” prosecution models.72  A “no-drop” policy—first developed in 
American jurisdictions during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s—denies the victim of 
domestic violence the option of freely withdrawing a complaint once formal charges have 
been filed.73  Under a “hard” no-drop policy, the district attorney’s office will subpoena 
the victim to court if necessary, and request a bench warrant for her arrest if she fails to 
appear.74  Far more common and realistic are so-called “soft” no-drop policies, where 
prosecutors look to a variety of factors (including but not limited to the victim’s wishes) 
in deciding whether to proceed with the case.75  Such other factors may include the 
seriousness of the battery, the defendant’s prior criminal record, the level of lethality of 
                                                 
67Myrna Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAGAZINE, Summer 2005, at 25.   
68Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279–80 (2006).   
69 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E. 2d 444, 448 (Ind. 2005), rev’d 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
70 In this article I will refer to the domestic violence victim with the female pronoun and the alleged batterer 
with the male pronoun, in order to accurately reflect the most common demographics of this crime in our 
society.   Studies show that over ninety percent of domestic violence victims are women.  Cheryl Hanna, 
No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1849, 1854 (1996). 
71 See Lininger, supra  note 2, at 769–71 (collecting authorities); see also  LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN 42–70 (1979).   
72 Percival, supra  note 20, at 243.   
73 See Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1861–63; Angela Corsilles, No-drop Policies in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence Cases:  Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORD. L. REV. 853, 856 
(1994). 
74 Proponents of “hard” no-drop strategies argue that where the defense lawyer knows that the prosecution 
is able and willing to go forward with the case notwithstanding the victim’s wishes, many domestic 
violence cases will result in plea bargains, thus ultimately sparing the victim the trauma of testifying 
notwithstanding the apparent threat of forcing her to do so.  Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1867.  
75 “Even under a no-drop policy, a prosecutor will often dismiss a case involving a reluctant victim out of 
concern and respect for her.”  Id. at 1873.   
R. Michael Cassidy 
 10 
the defendant’s future predicted behavior, the exposure of children to the violence, and 
the availability of evidence other than the victim’s testimony to prove the case.76  In these 
“soft” no-drop jurisdictions, prosecutors generally follow a presumption that the case will 
be prosecuted, but this presumption may be rebutted in situations where testifying will 
pose a serious risk of physical or emotional danger to the victim.77       
 
A second strategy used in conjunction with no-drop policies is to develop 
methods to prove domestic violence charges without the victim’s cooperation should it be 
necessary to do so.  The term “evidence based prosecutions” refers to trial methods in 
domestic violence cases that do not rely on live testimony by the victim.78  To prove the 
charges, prosecutors typically rely on tapes of the victim’s 911 call, photographs of the 
victim’s injuries taken at the scene, and the police officer’s first response testimony 
describing the physical condition of the home and any admissions made by the 
defendant.79  When necessary, an expert on Battered Women’s Syndrome will be called 
to explain to the victim’s absence; that is, to offer a psychological explanation of why a 
victim may recant or refuse to cooperate in the prosecution of her abuser.80  Key to the 
success of such “evidence based” prosecutions is the in-court testimony of police 
dispatchers, responding officers, or ambulance attendants repeating what the victim said 
to them immediately after the incident regarding the source and nature of her injuries. 81   
 
Domestic violence crimes are unique in that they typically carried out in the 
privacy of the home; often there are no witnesses available to prove the crime other than 
the victim herself.82  “[T]hese cases are more likely than others to rely on hearsay 
statements by accusers who may recant or refuse to cooperate with the prosecution at the 
time of trial.”83   The “workhorses” of domestic violence prosecutions under an evidence-
based prosecution model are excited utterances and statements for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis  or treatment.84  Prosecutors frequently rely on statements to first responders not 
only to compensate for subsequently uncooperative victims, but also because these 
statements tend to be more accurate descriptions of what happened than later 
equivocations or recantations.  Studies show that initial statements to police at the scene 
                                                 
76 Id. at 1898, 1901–09. It is considered critical to the success of either type of no-drop policy that the 
government provide counseling and support to domestic violence victims, so that they feel empowered to 
go forward with the trial if their testimony is needed.  Id. at 1861–64.  
77 See id. at 1863–64. 
78 Lininger, supra  note 2, at 752 n. 24.    
79 Raeder, supra  note 67, at 24;  Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest 
and No Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 293 
(2003). 
80 See Lininger, supra  note 2, at 812. 
81 Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecutions, 28 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 
301, 310 (2004–2005).  See generally FED. R. EVID. 803(3) & 803(4).  
82 Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The Potential Impact of Crawford v. Washington on Child 
Abuse, Elderly Abuse, and Domestic Violence Litigation, CHAMPION, Sept–Oct. 2004 at 21; see Malinda L. 
Seymore, Against the Peace and Dignity of the State:  Spousal Violence and Spousal Privilege, 2 TEXAS 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 239, 257 (1995).  The same could certainly be said of child sexual abuse cases, but the 
impact of Crawford  on these types of prosecutions is beyond the scope of this article. 
83 Lininger, supra  note 2, at 768.   
84 Raeder, supra  note 3, at 332. 
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tend to be more consistent with the overall evidence (physical injuries and disruption at 
the scene) than later recantations.85   
 
The current practice of going forward with criminal charges in domestic violence 
cases over the objection of the original complainant has its critics.  Some feminist 
scholars have argued that a woman’s desire not to proceed to trial in domestic violence 
cases should be honored, not only out of respect for the woman’s autonomy but also due 
to concerns that forcing testimony will further traumatize the victim and/or erode her 
sense of self esteem and control.86  The two most common feminist critiques of “no-
drop” policies are that 1) they are paternalistic; that is, they suggest that the state knows 
what is best for women; and 2) they revictimize women by subjecting them to further 
coercion at the hands of the state.87  Pro-prosecution advocates and other feminist 
scholars have advanced several convincing counterarguments to this critique.  First, 
aggressive prosecution strategies may actually protect the physical safety of the 
immediate victim.  Where the state retains the option to proceed with the case 
notwithstanding the victim’s wishes, it decreases the incentive of the batterer to threaten, 
intimidate or harm the witness.88  Studies show that if victim does not cooperate and there 
is a dismissal, she is more likely to be beaten again by the same batterer.89   Second, 
proceeding with the prosecution over the victim’s objections may protect other women 
who might enter into future relationships with the defendant.  Third, the “autonomy” 
argument of some feminists fails because it is well documented that domestic violence 
victims frequently make choices against their best interests due to fear and intimidation. 90  
When a domestic violence victim informs a prosecutor that she does not want to go 
forward with pending charges against her abuser, this is not really a “free” choice at all—
respecting the woman’s desire to dismiss the case is the equivalent of respecting the 
batterer’s option to coerce his prey. 91 
 
Perhaps most importantly, domestic violence is a public rather than an individual 
problem.92  The criminal justice system has been put in place for the community’s 
benefit, not to vindicate the interests of individual citizens. 93  Domestic violence causes 
billions of dollars of in property damage and loss each year (including medical costs, 
                                                 
85 Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1902; King-Ries, supra  note 81, at 327.   
86 See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly, Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 550, 569–570 (1999) (citing authorities). 
87 See Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1855. 
88 Id. at 1892; see FINAL REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS 70–71 (1994) (reflecting a 
growing awareness that leaving the decision with the battered spouse about whether or not to go through 
with charges opens her up to threats from her abuser and gives the abuser a wedge to use against her).  
89 Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1895. 
90 King- Ries, supra  note 81, at 325; see  Seymore,  supra  note 82, at 247 (1995).   
91 For a feminist critique of the adverse testimonial privilege, see Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It A Crime:  
Feminist Perspectives On Spousal Immunity And Spousal Violence, 90 N.W.U. L. REV. 1032, 1073 (1996) 
(arguing that refusal of the state to intervene in private matters does not expand victim autonomy, it simply 
substitutes private power of the typically male batterer for the public power of government). 
92 Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 173, 
174 (1997).   
93 WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN AMERICA IN ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 295, 295–
296 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel, III eds. 1977).    
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healthcare, police and fire protection services, and victim services).94  Batterers pose a 
threat not only to their partners but also to their children and their communities.95  Police 
officers put their lives at risk by responding to a victim’s call for help ;96 having invoked 
the resources of society, domestic violence victims have forfeited the right to exercise a 
veto over how society decides to respond to the threat once it has been exposed.97  
Mandating prosecution when the state decides that it is in the public interest treats 
domestic violence victims like victims of other crimes—including victims of rape, gang-
related activities, and whistleblowers in corporate fraud cases.  These victims too face 
internal and external pressure to drop criminal charges, but the state does not reflexively 
accede to their wishes.98   
 
In this ongoing philosophical debate about whether to honor the wishes of 
domestic violence victims, perhaps “the numbers” provide us with the best guidance.99  
Aggressive prosecution strategies in the last decade have been successful in stemming the 
rising tide of intimate partner abuse.100  Between 1994 and 2003, some studies estimate 
that the reported incidence of domestic violence has fallen by as much as fifty percent.101  
For example, after the City of San Diego adopted a “no-drop” prosecution strategy, the 
number of annual domestic violence-related homicides in the City of San Diego fell from 
a high of thirty to a low of seven.102   
 
Most commentators agree that prior to Crawford our society was making 
important inroads against domestic violence through aggressive prosecution strategies 
                                                 
94 Roberta L. Valente, Domestic Violence and the Law in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR 
LEGAL PRACTICE :  A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK, 1-1 to 3-3 (Deborah M. Goelman ed. 1996).  According to 
one commentator, emergency room visits, hospitalizations, and private physician appointments attributable 
to domestic violence in this country cost $100,000,000 annually.  Raoul Felder, Should Victims be Force to 
Testify Against Their Will?  Yes: It’s Time to Declare War on Spouse Abuse, 82-MAY A.B.A. J. 76, 76 
(1996).  In 1995, the total cost of intimate partner violence—including estimates of lost earnings and lost 
productivity--exceeded  $5.8 billion.  National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Costs of Intimate 
Partner Violence Against Women in the United States 32 (March 2003), available at, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf. 
95 Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1889.  The empirical evidence demonstrates that “children who grow up in a 
violent family are more likely to engage in acts of violence in their own relationships.”  Id. at 1895.   
96 Between 1995 and 2004, sixty police officers in this country were killed responding to calls alleging 
family quarrels.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND 
ASSAULTED T.20 (2004), available at , http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2004/openpage.htm.   
97 Debra Saunders, Battered, But Still Responsible, S. F. CHRON., April 5, 2001 (arguing that battered 
women have civic responsibilities once they invoke the resources of the police and the courts); see 8 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughten ed. 1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE] (“He who will live by society must let society live by him, when it requires to.”). 
98 See Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1891.     
99 Id. at 1857, 1885–1889 (arguing that societal benefits gained through aggressive criminal justice 
response to domestic violence far outweighs short term costs to victim autonomy).    
100 Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners:  Some Innovations in the Law 
of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89, 95 (1997). 
101 Nathan Max, Domestic Violence on Decline, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, December 21, 2004, at A1. 
See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEPT . OF JUSTICE , INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE , 1993–2001 2 (NCJ 
197838), available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.   
102 Mark Hansen, New Strategies in Battering Cases, 81-AUG A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (1995). 
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and public education.103  But Crawford threatens to eliminate or reverse these hard-
fought gains. As one commentator has dramatically noted, the Supreme Court’s new 
Confrontation Clause analysis has brought the practice of trials without victims to “an 
abrupt halt.”104  Professor Lininger surveyed sixty prosecutors’ offices in the states of 
Washington, Oregon, and California six months following the Crawford decision; sixty-
three percent  of the offices responding indicated that Crawford had significantly impeded 
domestic violence prosecutions in their jurisdictions, and seventy-six percent  indicated 
that they are now more likely to drop domestic violence charges when the victim recants 
or refuses to cooperate.105  These jurisdic tions are not unique.  In Dallas County, close to 
fifty percent of the domestic violence cases set for trial were dropped in the summer 
following the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision. 106   
 
This trend is not likely to improve after Davis.  Only those portions of a 911 
recording in which the questioner is “determining the need for emergency assistance” 
will be admissible where the victim does not testify at trial.107   With respect to excited 
utterances made to police officers at the scene of an alleged attack, some will be 
admissible  and some will not, depending on whether the emergency has subsided and 
what the trial court determines to be the “primary purpose” of the interrogation. 108  
Statements made by the victim to nurses, ambulance attendants, and doctors for the 
purposes of medical treatment that would otherwise be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 
803(b)(4) or a state analogue 109 may no longer be admitted where the questioning is 
                                                 
103 King- Ries, supra  note 81, at 328. 
104 Raeder, supra  note 3, at 330.   
105Liniger, supra  note 2, at 750.     
106 Robert Tharp, Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test: Ruling That Suspects Can Confront Accusers 
Scares Some Victims From Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 6, 2004 at 1A.  
107 Davis  v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006) (calling for redaction of that portion of the tape 
where the operator is questioning the caller for the primary purpose of gathering evidence). 
108 Id. at 2279 (noting that “initial inquiries”  designed to respond to an ongoing “exigency” or  “threatening 
situation” will produce nontestimonial statements, but where the immediate danger has passed any 
questioning to establish historical events will be considered testimonial.).  See also  supra  notes 58-62, and 
accompanying text.  But see id. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (taking 
position that distinguishing between primary purpose of emergency response and gathering evidence is “an 
exercise in fiction.”  “[T]he fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. Hammon’s past conduct 
does not foreclose the possibility that the primary purpose of his inquiry was to assess whether Mr. 
Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife.”)  Id. at 2284.    Adding to this confusion as to how to 
apply the “primary purpose” test is certain scattered language in Davis majority opinion focusing on the 
declarant’s point of view.  See id. at 2276 (characterizing  911 call as “plainly a call for help” rather than a 
“narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger.”).  One post Davis appellate decision has relied 
on the above language to conclude that the trial court’s focus in assessing the admissibility of the statement 
should be on the declarant’s primary purpose, considered objectively, rather than on the primary purpose of 
the police in making the inquiry.  State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 322 (W.Va. 2006). 
109 Many jurisdictions treat statements to medical personnel about source of injury (spouse or partner) as 
within the Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) hearsay exception because reasonably pertinent to the treatment to be 
provided.  See U.S. v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993); State v. Stahl, 2005 WL 602687 (Ohio App. 
2005); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906, 911 (Wash. App. 2005); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 
2004); Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App. 1991)..    The “attacker’s identity can determine a 
release date and location, the need for other services, and even the course of treatment, such as counseling.”  
King-Ries supra  note 81, at 312.  In the domestic violence field, “[a] patient’s history is 85% of his or her 
diagnosis.” Nelson, supra  note 64, at 29.  See also  FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note 
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considered a “police interrogation,”  either because the medical professional is working 
with law enforcement authorities as part of a multi-jurisdictional task force, or because 
the medical professional has a statutory duty to report domestic violence to law 
enforcement authorities under state law. 110  Even where the medical professional is acting 
in a private capacity and therefore not conducting a “police interrogation” within the 
narrowest class of “testimonial” hearsay recognized by the Supreme Court to date, the 
conversation may satisfy one of the broader possible definitions of testimony alluded to 
by the Court in Crawford.111   
 
 In short, “evidence based” prosecutions are in jeopardy after Crawford and 
Davis.  The Court’s originalist approach to the Confrontation Clause puts a premium on 
securing the actual attendance of domestic violence victims at trial.  “While not every 
statement of an absent domestic violence victim will be excluded, enough will be to 
require a reassessment of current practices.”112   
 
 One common reason victims are “unavailable” for cross examination at trial is 
that they assert a marital privilege and are excused from testifying.113  Indeed, that is 
what happened in the Crawford case, eventually giving rise to the Court’s new 
“testimonial” approach to the Sixth Amendment.  Mrs. Crawford was excused from 
testifying against her husband under the Washington state marital privilege law, and 
instead of live testimony the state relied on her recorded interview with the police.114  
Since Crawford was decided in 2004, numerous state court convictions for domestic 
violence have been reversed on appeal where the victim refused to testify at trial in 
reliance on a state marital privilege, and the government proceeded with a prosecution 
based on the victim’s out of court hearsay statements.115   
                                                                                                                                                 
(explaining that the hearsay exception “also extends to statements as to causation” if reasonably pertinent to 
treatment).    
110 See State v. Hooper, ___ P.3d ___, 2006 WL 2328233, *4 (Id. 2006)(collecting cases in which courts 
have held a victim’s statements to medical personnel were testimonial because she was “act[ing] in concert 
with or at the behest of the police.”); In re T.T. , 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 993 (2004) (holding that victim’s 
statements to treating physician identifying the defendant as the perpetrator “implicate[s] the core concerns 
protected by the confrontation clause.[,]” but admitted statements “regarding the nature of the alleged 
attack, the physical exam, and complaints of pain or injury.”); see also  Mosteller, supra  note 3, at 518, 602.  
Some jurisdictions have developed task forces to coordinate the efforts of emergency medical personnel, 
battered women’s advocates, police, and the district attorney’s office.   See Cochran, supra  note 100, at 
102. See also  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274n.2 (assuming that civilian 911 dispatchers are acting as  “agents” of 
law enforcement even if they are not police officers themselves).   
111 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (citing two other tests beyond narrowest formulation of 
testimonial:  1) whether an “objective witness” would reasonably believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial, and 2) whether the declarant  herself ‘would reasonably expect [the 
statement] to be used prosecutorially.”). 
112 Raeder, supra  note 3, at 330–31.   
113 See United States. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (successful assertion of a privilege renders a 
witness unavailable for cross examination under the Confrontation Clause). See also  FED. R. EVID. 804(a) 
(defining unavailability to include excusal on the ground of privilege).  
114 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)). 
115 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 615 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (overturning husband’s convictions for 
terroristic threats and obstructing a person making an emergency phone call); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (overturning conviction for violating a domestic protection order because victim’s 
911 call telling operator the defendant had come to her home was testimonial); Commonwealth v. Foley, 
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Consider the following example from a real life drama that recently unfolded in 
Boston, Massachusetts.116  Former Linebacker Ted Johnson of the New England 
Patriots—winner of three Super Bowl rings—lived with his wife Jacqueline Johnson and 
their three children in Weston, Massachusetts.  Police were called to their home on 
Sunday, July 16, 2006 after receiving a report of a domestic disturbance.  Responding 
officers found Mrs. Johnson sitting on a stone wall along the driveway of their three story 
house visibly upset.  Jacqueline Johnson reported that she and her husband had an 
argument, and that the strapping and muscular Ted Johnson turned violent, grabbing her 
wrist, twisting it behind her back, and pushing her head repeatedly against a bookcase in 
their study.  Upon interviewing Ted Johnson, the police were told a different story.  
Johnson claimed that he tried to take some medication away from his wife for which she 
did not have a prescription, at which point she became violent, punching him in the upper 
body and head.  According to Ted Johnson, only then did he grab her wrist and push her 
into the bookcase in order to defend himself.  Both parties were arrested and charged with 
assault and battery.  Following arraignment, a family lawyer issued a statement that the 
entire incident had been a “misunderstanding’ and that the Johnsons had each signed an 
affidavit agreeing not to testify against each other in the criminal case.  In Massachusetts, 
they have that right.  The state marital privilege statute allows a witness to refuse to 
testify against their spouse when the latter is a defendant in a criminal proceeding, with 
no applicable exception for crimes allegedly committed by one spouse against another.117  
Before Crawford, the Johnson prosecution—if the government decided to proceed with 
this case at all—would have had to rely on excited utterances made to the police 
immediately after the event.  After Crawford, this prosecution will be all but impossible.  
 
In light of Crawford, states should be reconsidering their state marital privilege 
statutes to determine whether they truly are in accord with the public interest.  After all, 
one glimmer of hope for prosecutors in the Crawford opinion is that hearsay statements 
may be admitted at trial so long as the declarant testifies and is subject to cross 
examination;  it does not matter whether the victim affirms or disavows the prior 
statement, or even if she recants the allegation of abuse entirely.118  Physical presence and 
testimony at trial--coupled with the option of the defendant to cross examine-- are all that 
are necessary to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause.  Domestic violence 
prosecutions can thus still be successful with uncooperative witnesses (even those who 
profess a complete lack of memory of the incident)119 so long as no valid privilege stands 
as a lawful impediment to their being called as a witness. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
833 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005) (overturning husband’s conviction of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon).   
116 Ari Bloomekatz, Ex Patriot Player, Wife Arrested After Scrap, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2006 at B1. 
117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20. 
118 Crawford , 541 U.S. at 59–60n.9 (“When the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements”) (citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). 
119 See Owens, 484 U.S. at 561–63. 
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IV.  Origins  and Purposes of the Marital Privileges 
 
 Evidentiary privileges contravene the general principle that “‘the public…has a 
right to every man’s evidence.’”120  Because they tend to impede the accurate 
ascertainment of the truth, privileges are strictly construed and recognized only where 
necessary to protect interests superior to the truth seeking function of the courts.121      
 
The recognition of evidentiary privileges in the United States followed English 
common law.  Testimonial privileges first began to appear in England in the sixteenth 
century, when the practice of deciding cases based on the jurors’ personal knowledge of 
events gave way to the more modern practice of presenting factual testimony to the jury 
via lay witnesses.122  Reliance on fact witnesses led to a universal duty to testify when 
summonsed to appear,123 which in turn led to judicially recognized exceptions to this 
general civic responsibility.124  
 
In the United States, the so-called “marital”125 privileges vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and are predominantly statutory in nature.126  In general, there are two 
different types of marital privilege :  the option of a witness to refuse to testify against 
their spouse when that party is a defendant in a criminal case (for reasons discussed 
below, this privilege is often referred to as the marital or spousal “disqualification”) ; and, 
the right of either spouse in a civil or criminal case to refuse to reveal confidential 
communications between them.127  While these two privileges often overlap, they are 
                                                 
120 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980) (internal citations omitted). 
121 David W. Louisell & Byron M. Crippin, Jr., Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413, 414 (1956). 
“[T]hese exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 
(1974). 
122 Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455 (1985) 
[hereinafter Privileged Communications]. 
123  English law provided courts with the power to compel testimony in 1562.  See  5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 12 
(1562) (Eng.). 
124 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1455.  
125  For ease of reference in this article, I will refer to the spousal relationship as a lawful union between a 
man and a woman.  In states that allow marriage or civil unions between homosexual couples, the pertinent 
state marital privilege may apply to those relationships as well.  See VT . ST . ANN. Tit. 15 § 1204(e)(15) 
(applying state law of privilege to civil unions); Goodrich v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
955–56 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that limiting the benefits and protections of civil marriage to opposite sex 
couples violates the state constitution, and including  in this discussion “evidentiary rights, such as the 
prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about their private conversations.”)   No federal 
court has yet applied the federal common law of marital privilege to homosexual couples. See Elizabeth 
Kimberly Penfil, In Light of Reason and Experience:  Should Federal Evidence Law Protect Confidential 
Communications Between Same-Sex Partners? ,  88 MARQ. L REV. 815,  831 (2005).   
126 STONE AND TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 5.01 at 5-2. 
127 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 18.05. 
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doctrinally distinct and protect different interests.128  In discussing the genesis and 
contours of the marital privileges I will refer to the first privilege as the “adverse 
testimonial privilege” and the second privilege as the “confidential communications 
privilege.” 
 
 The privilege against adverse spousal testimony is generally considered to be a 
vestige of a long-abandoned common law rule that completely disqualified one spouse 
from testifying either for or against their marital partner in either a civil or criminal 
proceeding. 129  Writing in 1628, Lord Coke stated that a “wife cannot be produced either 
against or for her husband.”130  The disqualification sprang from two cannons of 
medieval jurisprudence—a party is not allowed to testify on his own behalf due to his 
interest in the proceedings, and a husband and wife were recognized as one legal 
entity. 131  Over time, the rule evolved from a rule of total incompetence,132 to a 
disqualification in criminal cases only,133 to a rule giving the defendant the right to 
prohibit only adverse testimony in criminal case, but allowing the defendant to call his 
spouse to testify on his behalf,134 to a privilege in criminal cases held by the witness 
spouse only. 135  The parties must be married at the time of the criminal trial in order for 
                                                 
128 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1564.  The two privileges overlap when a witness 
currently married to the defendant is called to testify against him at a criminal trial as to confidential 
communications between the two of them during the marriage.  Either privilege may then be relied upon as 
grounds for refusing to testify.  There is no overlap, however, when a divorced spouse is called at a 
criminal trial to testify against her husband as to conversations which occurred during the marriage.  In that 
situation, only the confidential communication privilege and not the adverse testimonial privilege would 
apply.  There is also no overlap when a spouse is called to testify to conversations with a criminal 
defendant that pre-dated the marriage.  In that situation, only the adverse testimonial privilege, and not the 
confidential communication, privilege would apply. 
129 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).   
130 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628).   
131  Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.  Dean Wigmore disputed this traditional view, arguing that the adverse 
testimony privilege developed independently from the spousal disqualification rule.  Wigmore believed the 
adverse testimonial privilege originated from the sixteenth century social acceptance of the husband as 
head of the household, and the corresponding legal doctrine that a wife or servant who harmed the head of 
the household could be punished for petit treason.  8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, 
§ 2227 at 211–213. (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).   
132 See Bent v. Allot, 22 Engl. Rep. 50 (1579–1580). 
133 Lord Brougham’s Act in England (Evidence Act of 1851) repealed the rule of incompetence and made 
both party and spouse competent and callable witnesses, except in criminal cases.  Shelton v. Tyler, L.R.. 
1939 at 626.   See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.31 at 558 (1999). 
134  Funk v. United States, 290 US 371, 376 (1933) (recognizing that the modern trend is to enlarge the 
domain of competency and leave credibility to jurors).  “A refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of 
interest to testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for 
himself, presents a manifest incongruity.” Id. at 381; see Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify 
Against The Other in Criminal Cases Where The Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential 
Communications:  Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 370 (1952).   
135 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.  Although in federal court today the witness spouse alone holds the adverse 
testimonial privilege, as will be discussed in the next section some states continue to vest the adverse 
testimonial privilege in the hands of the defendant. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060.  Other states 
place this privilege in the hands of both spouses (in effect allowing the witness spouse to decline to testify 
even if the party spouse subpoenas them, and allowing the party spouse to prevent the witness from 
testifying if subpoenaed by the government).  See, e.g., W.VA . CODE ANN. §57-3-3. 
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the witness to invoke the adverse testimonial privilege.136  Where applicable, the witness 
spouse may refuse to testify both as to facts observed and as to matters communicated to 
her by the defendant spouse.137 
 
In contrast, the confidential communication privilege protects private 
conversations between husband and wife.  This marital privilege may be one of the oldest 
testimonial privileges recognized at English common law, predated only by the attorney 
client privilege.138  The typical prerequisites to the application of the confidential 
communication privilege are that 1) there was a communication (that is, words or 
utterances intended to convey a message);139 2) between two persons who were married 
at the time of the communication;140 and 3) the communication was intended to be kept 
confidential (that is, not made in the presence of a third party or intended to be 
communicated to a third party).141  Both spouses typically hold the privilege, and thus 
either may object to testimony revealing a private communication. 142  The confidential 
communication privilege typically applies in both criminal and civil proceedings, and one 
spouse need not be a party to the proceeding for the privilege to be invoked.143   
 
The two primary justifications for evidentiary privileges are utilitarian and 
humanistic.144  A utilitarian justification for privileges recognizes that sometimes 
                                                 
136 GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 501.6, at 216 (1999).  See United States v. 
Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing authorities).  Where the witness and defendant marry 
for the sole purpose of disqualifying the spouse as a witness, the courts can pierce the privilege if they find 
the marriage a sham.  Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 614-15 (1953). But see State v. Gianakos, 
644 N.W.2d 409, 417 (requiring a strong showing to conclude that that marriage is so empty as to render 
purpose of the privilege valueless). 
137 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1563. 
138 H. BATHURST , THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE 99–100 (London 1671).  But see Shelton v. Tyler, L.R. 1939 
at 633 (reviewing English legal history and suggesting that no common law privilege for confidential 
communications existed independent of the marital disqualification prior to statutory enactments).  
139 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1572. 
140 The confidential communication privilege survives the termination of the marriage; so long as the 
speakers were legally wed at the time of the communication, the privilege may be asserted to bar revelation 
of the contents of the communication even if the speakers are divorced at the time of the judicial 
proceeding.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 85 at 308 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
141 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra  note 127,  § 18.05(3)(b).  See C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  § 5586–87 (1973);  Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1573.  See 
generally State v. Parent, 836 So.2d 494, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660, 665 
(N.C. 1992).  
142 WEISSENBERGER, supra  note 136, at 219; Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1571.  Some 
jurisdictions suggest that only the party making the communication holds the privilege, but that the party 
receiving the communications is authorized to assert it on the other’s behalf in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary.  See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. § 504(1)(c). Cf. United States. v. Figueroa-Paz, 408 F.2d 1055, 1057 
(9th Cir. 1972) (holding that the speaker-spouse waives the privilege if she fails to object to the testimony 
as to her communication).  In these latter jurisdictions the party making the communication may force the 
recipient spouse to testify about the communication if the sender/speaker so desires.    
143 Shelton v. Tyler, L.R. 1939 (Chancery)  at 627.  See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2334 at 648. 
144 Penfil, supra  note 125, at 818.  In addition to utilitarian and humanistic rationales, scholars have 
advanced both “power” and “image” theories of privilege.  A power theory suggests that whatever citizens 
or professional organizations command the most power and social prestige are likely to have their 
communications privileged by legislators or the judiciary.  See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra  note 141, 
§5422, at 673–79.   An image theorist argues that society recognizes particular communications and 
Reconsidering Spousal Privileges 
 19 
witnesses should be excused from testifying in order to promote or preserve relationships 
which society values above the truth finding functions of its courts.145  Utilitarian 
theorists justify privileges as a way of promoting the public good; that is, a privilege will 
be recognized where the social benefits to be achieved from excusing the witness exceed 
the social costs of losing the testimony.   When privacy is valued not for its own sake but 
for its beneficial effects—such as promoting free speech or successful interpersona l 
relationships—it becomes a utilitarian rather than a purely humanistic justification. 146   
Supporters of a utilitarian rationale for testimonial privileges include John Henry 
Wigmore 147 and, more recently, Thomas Krattenmaker.148   
 
The traditional utilitarian justification for a marital adverse testimonial privilege is 
that forcing one spouse to testify against another in a criminal case would lead to one of 
two unacceptable results: it could potentially cause a break up of the marriage if the 
witness spouse testified truthfully and inculpated her husband, or it could promote 
perjury.149   Lord Coke, speaking of the adverse spousal testimony privilege in the early 
seventeenth century, reasoned that forcing a witness to testify against their accused 
spouse would "be a cause of implacable discord and dissension" in the marriage.150  Lord 
Hardwicke similarly explained that this privilege was necessary to "preserve the peace of 
families."151   
 
A utilitarian argument in support of a marital confidential communication 
privilege is that individuals would be inhibited from confiding in their spouses unless 
private conversations were shielded from disclosure in court.   That is, denying a 
privilege for confidential communications between husbands and wives would chill 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationships as privileged because it would be embarrassing or demeaning for the state to compel 
testimony in certain circumstances, leading to disrespect of the government.  See Amanda H. Frost, 
Updating the Marital Privileges, a Witness Centered Rationale, 14 WISC. WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 20 (1999) 
(“Widespread acts of perjury and contempt threaten the accuracy of verdicts and public confidence in the 
legal system.”); Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1499.   
145 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 
(1960)). “Their warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are 
regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice or availability of evidence relevant to 
the administration of justice.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 101. 
146 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1583. 
147 Wigmore posited  four threshold conditions for the application of an evidentiary privilege: 
1) the communication must have originated in confidence; 
2) the confidence must be essential to the relationship in question;  
3) the relationship must be one worth fostering; and  
4) the injury to society from disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit to 
society and the truth finding function achieved by disclosure. 
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2396.  Wigmore believed that  utilitarian reasoning supported a privilege for 
confidential communications between spouses, but not an adverse testimonial privilege.  According to 
Wigmore, marital harmony depends on a variety of subtle factors, and the dissension possibly caused by 
one spouse testifying against another is “only a casual and minor one, not to be exaggerated into the 
foundation of so important a rule.”  Id. § 2228 at 216. 
148 Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts:  An Alternative to the Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L. J. 61, 86–88 (1973-74). 
149 See Clements v. Marston, 52 N.H. 31, 36 (1872).  See generally Note, supra  note 134, at 359. 
150 COKE, supra  note 130, § 6b. 
151 Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736).   
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private spousal conversation, which in turn would lead to less productive and successful 
marital relationships.152  In the early nineteenth century English case of Doker v. Hasler, 
the court stated that “the happiness of the marriage state requires that the confidence 
between a man and wife should be kept ever inviolable.”153 
 
Commentators have noted the lack of any empirical evidence to support 
traditional utilitarian arguments about the social efficacy of the marital privileges.154   For 
example, with regard to the confidential communication privilege some commentators 
have argued that it is based on “debatable behavioral assumptions,” because few couples 
are aware of the law of evidence and are likely to take judicial considerations into 
account in deciding whether to communicate with one another.155  Nonetheless, the 
rationale for evidentiary privileges most frequently cited by the United States Supreme 
Court in the twentieth century is the utilitarian justification. 156    
 
A humanistic strand also continues to pervade much of the discussion in support 
of the marital privileges.157  Such a rationale for privileges suggests that it is 
fundamentally indecent for the law to intrude upon certain intimate relationships.158  
Early English cases relied on humanistic rationales in creating testimonial privileges, 
                                                 
152 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86 at 309 (noting that some argue that confidential communication 
privilege is justified in order to “encourage marital confidences” and thus “promote harmony between 
husband and wife”).  See also  Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (in recognizing marital 
confidential communication privilege under federal law “in light of reason and experience,” Supreme Court 
stated that “[t]he basis of the immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the 
protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship 
as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails”). 
153 171 E.R. 992 (Ry. & Moo 1824). 
154 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86 at 309.  See Robert Weisberg and Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws 
and State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 
143, 183 (1984).  Spouses confide in each other because they love and trust one another, not because the 
law protects the privacy of their communications. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , § 86 at 201; see Robert M. 
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. 
REV. 675, 682 (1929) (“As far as the writers are aware…marital harmony among lawyers who know about 
privileged communications is not vastly superior to that of that of other professional groups”).  Cf. In re 
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (in refusing to recognize a parent-child privilege, the Third 
Circuit noted lack of  any evidence that confidential communications are essential to a successful parent-
child relationship).  “Even assuming arguendo that children and their parents generally are aware of 
whether or not their communications are protected from disclosure, it is not certain that the existence of a 
privilege enters into whatever thought processes are performed by children in deciding whether or not to 
confide in their parents.”  Id.   
155  Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1579. 
156 “Our cases make clear that an asserted privilege must also ‘serve public ends.’”  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 
U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).   See also  Trammel v. 
United States  , 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)(stating privileges will be accepted “only to the very limited extent 
that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.”) (quoting Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 234 (1960)).   
157 See, e.g., Frost, supra  note 144, at 5 (arguing that marital privileges do not shape conduct of spouses, 
but rather respond to loyalty that they harbor for each other--even if that loyalty is  misplaced). 
158 See, e.g., RICHARD M. GULA, S.S., ETHICS IN PASTORAL MINISTRY 120–121 (Paulist Press 1996) 
(discussing ethical foundations for clergy duty of confidentiality). Cf. Charles Black, The Marital and 
Physician Privileges—A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L. J. 45 (1975). 
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acknowledging that "privileges reflected the legal system's respect for human dignity."159  
Under a humanistic rationale, evidentiary privileges embody the fundamental regard in 
which society holds individual rights, especially privacy and autonomy.160  Charles 
Wright and Kenneth Graham illustrate the core concerns of the humanistic view when 
they observe that "[t]he question of privilege is not really 'what are the empirical results 
of permitting this witness to remain silent?;' it is 'what kind of people are we who 
empower courts in our name to compel parents, friends, and lovers to become informants 
on those who have trusted in them?’"161  Among the modern supporters of a humanistic 
view of privileges are David Louisell162 and Edward Imwikelried.163  
 
Under a humanistic view of the marital privileges, it is simply morally wrong—if 
not cruel—to require a spouse to testify against her partner in a criminal case, because it 
forces one spouse to be an instrumentality of their beloved’s demise.164   Using contempt 
powers to compel testimony from a reluctant spouse constitutes “blatant governmental 
intrusion into private relationships.”165  With regards to the privilege for confidential 
communications, a humanistic rationale suggests that couples have a right to 
confidentiality in their private conversations, and such intimate discourse should be 
beyond the reach of the government.166  Several commentators167 and at least one federal 
court168 have suggested that the government may not invade marital confidences without 
offending the couple ’s right to privacy under substantive due process guarantees.   
 
English common law recognized certain exceptions to both of the marital 
privileges, and these exceptions grew largely out of the doctrine of necessity. 169  In fact, 
                                                 
159 See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,  THE NEW WIGMORE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §§ 2.3, 5.3.3 (2002) 
(citing authorities).   
160 See Krattenmaker, supra note 148, at 92. 
161WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra  note 141, § 5422.1 (Supp. 2002)   
162 See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality Conformity and Confusion:  Privileges in Federal Court Today, 
31 TULANE L. REV. 101, 110–113 (1956-57). 
163  See IMWINKELRIED supra  note 159, §§ 2.3, 5.3.3. 
164  The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized in 1969 that one justification for 
the adverse testimonial privilege is the social “repugnancy” of requiring a person to condemn or be 
condemned by their marital partner.  46 F.R.D. 161, 264 (March, 1969).   
165 Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1584. 
166 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86 at 310 (1992) (“Probably the policy of encouraging confidences is not 
the primary reason in creating the privilege….It is a matter of emotion and sentiment.  All of us have a 
feeling of indelicacy and want of decorum in prying into the secrets of husband and wife.”) 
167Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives:  A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence as they Affect Marital Privileges, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1370–71 (1973); Note, Pillow 
Talk, Grimbribbers and Connubial Bliss:  The Marital Communications Privilege, 56 IND. L. J. 121, 139–
142 (1980). 
168 United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 945–46 (D. Colo. 1982), aff’d, 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).   
169 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2239, at 242.   In addition to cases involving crime by one spouse upon 
another, Wright and Graham identified fifteen other common exceptions to the marital privileges.  See 
Wright and Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  EVIDENCE §5591 (1989)(action for divorce; 
action for alienation of affections; action for abandonment or nonsupport; custody disputes; personal injury 
actions between the spouses; prosecutions for adultery, polygamy, and bigamy; will contests, 
communications in aid of a crime or fraud; prosecutions for sex crimes; where evidence is needed by a 
criminal defendant to prove his innocence; and where another statute makes the marital privilege 
inapplicable).   While some commentators frequently justify such exceptions on the basis of necessity, 
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one of the earliest exceptions recognized to the spousal disqualification rule was for 
crimes committed by the defendant against the person of the wife, such as battery or 
rape.170  This exception was considered vital because otherwise the husband would be 
immune from prosecution for crimes committed within the household in situations where 
the spouse could provide the only source of eyewitness testimony.   Even after the 
adverse testimonial privilege morphed and the election was determined to rest in the 
witness spouse rather than in the accused, many jurisdictions continued to recognize an 
exception for crimes by one spouse on another.171  The reasoning underlying this 
exception was that the public policy of having spouses punished for crimes committed in 
the household outweighs any state or personal interest in preserving what by all objective 
accounts is an apparently failing marriage.172   
 
The development of the law of marital privileges in federal courts tracked fairly 
closely to these common law origins, with some notable exceptions.  In 1965 Chief 
Justice Warren appointed an Advisory Committee to study and make proposals on 
uniform federal rules of evidence.173  When the Advisory Committee drafted Proposed 
Rule 505, it recommended limiting the privilege for adverse testimony to criminal 
cases.174   The Committee also vested the adverse testimonial privilege in hands of the 
criminal defendant, consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Hawkins v 
United States.175  The Committee recognized both utilitarian and humanistic reasons for 
recognizing an adverse testimonial privilege; that is, the prevention of marital dissention, 
and the social repugnancy of forcing one spouse to testify against another in 
circumstances that could lead to imprisonment.176   Notably, however, the Committee 
declined to recommend any marital confidential communications privilege for the federal 
courts, citing exclusively utilitarian concerns.177  The Committee believed that marriage 
is not primarily a verbal relationship, and therefore declining to recognize a confidential 
communication privilege would not have as great an impact on the institution of marriage 
as it would on professional relationships.178  This decision of the drafters to recommend 
abandonment of the marital confidential communication privilege prompted public 
                                                                                                                                                 
another way to look at this is to say that theoretical basis for protecting the information—preserving marital 
harmony-- does not exist in most of these situations.  Id.   
170  See Rex. v. Azire, 93 Eng. Rep. 746 (KB 1725) (assault); Lord Audley’s case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140 
(1631) (rape).  See generally 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 443 (Wayne Morrison ed. 2001). 
171  Lininger, supra  note 2, at 363. 
172  “[I]f the promotion of marital peace, and the apprehension of marital dissension, are the ultimate 
ground of the privilege, it is an overgenerous assumption that the wife who has been beaten, poisoned, or 
deserted is still on such terms of delicate good feeling with her spouse that her testimony must not be 
enforced lest the iridescent halo of peace be dispelled by the breath of disparaging testimony.” 8 WIGMORE 
ON EVIDENCE  § 2239 p. 243.   
173 Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 125 
(1973). 
174 46 F.R.D. 161, 263 (1969).   
175 358 U.S. 74 (1958).   
176 Id. at 264 (citing 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2229). 
177 46 F.R.D. at 264–65 (“[N]or can it be assumed that marital conduct will be affected by a privilege for 
confidential communications of whose existence the parties in all likelihood are unaware.”) 
178  “The other communications privileges, by way of contrast, have as one party a professional person who 
can be expected to inform the other of the existence of the privilege.” 46 F.R.D. at  265.   
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outcry, and was an important factor leading to congressional rejection of the Advisory 
Committee’s proposed rules.179 
 
In 1980 the Supreme Court interpreted the federal common law of marital 
privileges under Fed. R. Evid. 501180 very differently than the Advisory Committee had 
recommended only nine years earlier.181  The Court in Trammel v. United States affirmed 
the existence of an adverse testimonial privilege under federal law. 182  However, the 
Supreme Court placed the adverse testimonial privilege in the hands of the witness 
spouse, rather than in the hands of the criminal defendant, overruling Hawkins v. United 
States.183  
  
The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a privilege is 
unpersuasive.  When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal 
proceeding—whatever the motivation—their relationship is almost certainly in 
disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to 
preserve. 184   
 
Equally notably, the Court in dicta recognized the continued vitality of a common law 
privilege for a confidential communications, notwithstanding the Advisory Committee’s 
conclusion that this latter privilege lacked any justification under traditional utilitarian 
                                                 
179 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra  note 133, § 5.32 at 561. 
180 Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 after several years of study and debate. H.R. 
REP . NO. 93-650, at 3–4 (1973).  Rule 501 does not contain a specific list of privileges to be applied in the 
federal courts.  Instead, Rule 501 dictates the evolution and application of privileges “in the light of reason 
and experience.”  FED. R. EVID. 501.  This common law privilege formula adopted by Congress in Rule 501 
eschewed the nine specific enumerated privileges—including  a marital adverse testimonial privilege— 
recommended by the Advisory Committee and approved by the Supreme Court .  See PROPOSED RULE 
EVID. 505, 56 F.R.D. 183, 369 (1971). 
181 See FINAL REPORT ON ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 51 F.R.D. 315, 370 
(1971). 
182 445 U.S. 40 (1980).   
183 358 U.S. 74 (1958).   The defendant in Hawkins was charged with a violation of the Mann Act; that is, 
transporting a woman across interstate lines for immoral purposes.  Id. at 74.  The prosecution called the 
defendant’s wife as a witness against him, and she testified voluntarily.  The Supreme Court interpreted 
Funk  to apply only to testimony beneficial to accused; in that situation, there was no incompetence bar.  
But Funk  had left open to “further scrutiny” the question of adverse testimony.  Id. at 76.  According to the 
Court in Hawkins the policy justification for the rule prohibiting favorable testimony has eroded, but the 
justification for adverse testimony has not.  It is “difficult to see how family harmony is less disturbed by a 
wife’s voluntary testimony against her husband than by her compelled testimony.”  Id. at 78.  The Court 
felt that not all marital flare ups are permanent.  Id. at 77.  The “[l]aw should not force or encourage 
testimony which might alienate husband or wife, or further inflame  existing domestic differences.”  Id. at 
79 (emphasis added). 
184 Id. at 53.  While the Court in Trammel employed utilitarian reasoning in recognizing both marital 
privileges , id. at 50, it did not employ the test formulated by Wigmore.  WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra 
note 147.  Wigmore argued that in deciding whether privileges were justified, courts should look to the 
wider societal effects of that legal recognition, not to the individual effects on the relationship before the 
court.  Id.(factor (4)). The Court in Trammel, however, seemed more concerned about whether there was 
anything left to protect in the particular marital relationship before the court,  rather than marital 
relationships generally. 445 U.S. at 52.  Using this broader utilitarian reasoning, the Trammel approach 
suggests that injury to the parties is one “cost” the court should take into consideration in undertaking a 
cost-benefit analysis. 
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rationales.185   Against the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, both privileges 
are now recognized in federal courts under FRE 501.  
 
With particular significance for domestic violence cases, the Supreme Court in 
Trammel suggested in dicta that federal law might support an exception to both the 
adverse testimonial privilege and the confidential communication privilege for “cases in 
which one spouse commits a crime against the other.” 186  The Advisory Committee had 
recommended an exception to the adverse testimonial privilege for crimes against the 
spouse or a child of marriage, to prevent the “grave injustice” that would otherwise 
occur.187  It had not recommended such an exception to the confidential communication 
privilege, because the Advisory Committee had suggested eliminating that latter privilege 
entirely.  However, with a brief citation to Wigmore the Court in Trammel suggested, 
without deciding, that “similar exceptions” should be recognized to both privileges.188    
 
V. State Spousal Privilege Statutes and the Need for Reform 
 
The marital privileges are for the most part defined by the legislatures of our 
respective states.189  Jurisdictions differ on what types of proceedings the privileges can 
be exercised in, which spouse (or both) controls the privilege, and whether the court can 
look behind the marriage to assess the strength, vitality, and bona fides of the 
                                                 
185 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51–53 n.5 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (recognizing 
husband’s privilege to refuse to reveal communications from wife in grand jury proceeding)); Wolfle v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (recognizing marital confidential communications privilege under 
federal common law, but ruling that husband’s communications to wife through stenographer did not 
qualify). 
186 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46n.7.  Although the Court cited its earlier precedent in Wyatt v. United States, 
Wyatt  was actually a case involving only the privilege against adverse testimony.  362 U.S. 525 (1960).  
The defendant was charged with transporting a woman for the purposes of prostitution in violation of the 
Mann Act.  Id. at 525.  The alleged prostitute married the defendant prior to his trial.  Id. at 526.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the government may call a wife to testify against husband in a Mann Act 
prosecution, notwithstanding the both husband’s and wife’s objection, where the wife is the victim of the 
alleged misconduct.  Id. at 530.  The Court recognized that English common law admitted of an exception 
to adverse testimonial privilege for crimes against the wife.  Id. at 526.  The  “[b]asic purpose of the 
exception is to prevent the husband from abusing the wife with impunity”  Id. at 533n. 1 (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting).  Although the adverse testimonial privilege at that time was considered held by both the 
witness and the defendant, and therefore both must waive,  id. at 529, the Court held that where the 
testimony comes within a recognized exception to the privilege neither can exercise it.  
187  46 F.R.D. 161, 265 (1969) (citing Wyatt, 362 U.S. 525).   
188  445 U.S. at 46 n.7.  See also  Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 221 (1839) (suggesting that exception for 
“violence upon [wife’s] person” applies both to disqualification and to privilege for confidential 
communications.  Compare Model Code of Evidence 216 (1942) with Uniform Rule of Evidence 28(2) 
(1974) (both uniform rules of evidence recognize exception to confidential communication privilege and 
adverse testimonial privilege for crimes against person or property of the other spouse, or crimes against 
person or property of third person during the course of a crime against the spouse). 
189 See Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 46 F.R.D. 161, 263 (1969). The 
early nineteenth century saw the growth in the idea that legislation would “demystify, simplify, and make 
more predictive” a judicial process that for the first two centuries had been controlled by common law. 
Privileged Communications, supra  note 122, at 1458.  This trend led to codification of evidence law. Id. at 
1460. 
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relationship.190  Jurisdictions also differ widely in the terminology use to describe the two 
marital privileges—frequently invoking terms such as incompetence, immunity, and 
disqualification—which generates substantial confusion. 191  Although multi-state 
comparisons run the risk of oversimplification, some generalizations are possible. 
 
Thirty one states and the District of Columbia recognize the adverse testimonial 
privilege.192  Nineteen states have abandoned this privilege entirely, proceeding under the 
belief that the confidential communications privilege adequately protects marital 
privacy. 193   Of the states that still recognize the adverse testimonial privilege, most apply 
it to criminal cases only, although several states apply this privilege to both criminal and 
civil cases.194   In the vast majority of states the witness spouse holds the adverse 
testimonial privilege, consistent with Trammel v. United States.195  However, four states 
still follow the pre-Trammel rule that the defendant holds the adverse testimonial 
                                                 
190 Frost, supra  note 144, at 15. 
191  See, e.g., Glover v. State, 836 N.E.2d 414, 419-20 (Ind. 2005) (using “spousal incompetence” when 
discussing the adverse testimonial privilege and “disqualification” when discussing the confidential 
communication privilege); State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1172-73 (Conn. 2004) (stating the 
confidential communication privilege is a grant of immunity given to communications between husband 
and wife); Beck v. State, 587 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ga. App. 2003) (referring to the adverse testimonial 
privilege as “spousal immunity”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 780 N.E.2d 26, 32 (Mass. 2002) (holding that 
the confidential communication privilege is a rule of disqualification and is  not a privilege at all). 
192 See  ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (LexisNexis 2005); AK. R. EVID. 505(a);  ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-
4062 (Supp. 2005);  CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT . § 13-90-107 (2004);  CONN. 
GEN. STAT . ANN. § 54-84A (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (LEXISNEXIS 2001);  GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-
23  (1995);  HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1 (SUPP. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3002 (2004);  KY. R. EVID. 504; 
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 505 (2006);  MD. CODE ANN., CRTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (2002);  MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 20 (2000);  MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (WEST SUPP. 2006); MINN. STAT . 
ANN. § 595.02 (WEST 2000);  MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (2002);  MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (2002);  NEB. 
REV. STAT . § 27-505 (1995);  NEV. REV. STAT . 49.295 (SUPP. 2005); N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (WEST 
1994);  N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57 (2005);  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (WEST 1997); OR. REV. STAT . § 
40.255 (2005);  42 PA. CONS. STAT . § 5913 (2000);  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10 (2003);  TEX. R. EVID. 504(B); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (2002);  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (SUPP. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
5.60.060 (1) (SUPP. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (2005);  WYO. STAT . ANN. § 1-12-104 (2005). 
193 ARK. R. EVID. 504; DEL. R. EVID. 504; FLA. STAT . § 90.504 (1999); 725 ILL. COMP . STAT . 5/115-16 
(2002); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (1998); IOWA CODE § 622.9 (1999); KAN. STAT . ANN. § 60-423 
(2005); ME. REV. STAT . ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1999); MONT . CODE. ANN. § 46-16-212 (2005); N.H. R. EVID. 
504; N.M. STAT . ANN. § 38-6-6 (1998); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4502 (McKinney 1992); N.D. R. EVID. 504; 
OKLA. STAT . ANN. tit. 12, § 2504 (Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 19-13-13 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (2000); VT . STAT . ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (2002); 
WIS. STAT . ANN. § 905.05 (2000).  See Seymore, supra  note 91, at 1053. 
194  AK. R. EVID. 505(A); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2231 to -2232; CAL. EVID. CODE § 970; COLO. REV. STAT . § 
13-90-107;  D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; Idaho Code § 9-203; KY. R. EVID. 504;  MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 
600.2162;  MINN. STAT . ANN. § 595.02; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5; NEB. REV. STAT . § 27-505;  NEV. REV. 
STAT. 49.295; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1) ; WYO. STAT . ANN. § 1-12-104. 
195  Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137, 158 
(2001).  See  ALA. CODE § 12-21-227; AK. R. EVID. 505(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 970; CONN. GEN. STAT . 
ANN. § 54-84a; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23; HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-3002;  LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 505; MD. CODE ANN., CRTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106; MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 20; MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260;  NEV. REV. STAT . 49.295; N.J. STAT . ANN. § 
2A:84A-17; N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42;  OR. REV. STAT . § 40.255; 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT . § 5913; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10; TEX. R. EVID. 504(B); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8.  
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privilege,196 including the state of Washington whose decision in Crawford gave rise to 
the Supreme Court’s landmark Confrontation Clause ruling.  In five other states both 
spouses hold the adverse testimonial privilege; in these states, if  the witness, wants to 
testify against her spouse the defendant may prevent her from doing so, but if the 
defendant does not object to the testimony the witness may still refuse.197   
 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize a privilege for confidential 
communications between spouses.198  In most states this privilege applies in both 
criminal and civil proceedings, although four states limit its application to criminal 
cases.199   The greatest area of divergence with respect to the confidential communication 
privilege is in who holds the privilege.  The most common approach is to provide that 
both parties to the communication may assert the privilege.200  Where both spouses hold 
the privilege, disclosure by one spouse does not constitute a waiver of the privilege and 
the testifying spouse can continue to refuse to testify about the communication even if the 
other party calls the spouse as a witness.   Some states provide that the privilege rests 
only with the party to the criminal or civil proceeding;201 non-party witnesses may not 
                                                 
196 ARIZ. REV. STAT . Ann. § 13-4062; COLO. REV. STAT . § 13-90-107; MINN. STAT . ANN. § 595.02; WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1).  
197 KY. R. EVID. 504;  MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5; NEB. REV. STAT . § 27-505; W. VA . CODE ANN. § 57-3-3; 
WYO. STAT . ANN. § 1-12-104. See Enberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 83 (Wyo. 2001) (although statute was 
phrased in terms of incompetence,  court interpreted privilege to rest in hands of both spouses).   In 
Michigan the witness spouse holds the adverse testimonial privilege in criminal cases, but the party spouse 
holds the privilege in civil cases.  See MICH. COMP . L. ANN. § 600-2162.    
198 ALA. R. EVID. 504;  AK. R. EVID. 505(B); ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-4062;  ARK. R. EVID. 504;  CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 980; COLO. REV. STAT . § 13-90-107; DEL. R. EVID. 504; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; FLA. 
STAT. § 90.504; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21; HAW. R. EVID. 505; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203; 725 ILL. COMP . 
STAT. 5/115-16; IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-46-3-1; IOWA CODE § 622.9; KAN. STAT . ANN. § 60-423;  KY. R. 
EVID. 504; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504; ME. REV. STAT . ANN. TIT . 15, § 1315; MD. CODE ANN., CRTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 9-105; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 20; MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 600.2162;  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 595.02; MISS. R. EVID. 504; MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.260;  MONT . CODE. ANN. § 46-16-212;  
NEB. REV. STAT § 27-505; NEV. REV. STAT . § 49.295; N.H. R. EVID. 504; N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2A:84A-22; 
N.M. STAT . ANN. § 38-6-6; N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4502; N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57(C); N.D. R. EVID. 504; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY OHIO R. EVID. 601); OKLA. STAT . ANN. TIT . 12 
§ 2504; OR. REV. STAT . § 40.255; 42 PA. CONS. STAT . § 5914; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 19-13-13; TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201; TEX. R. EVID. 504(A); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8; VT . 
STAT. ANN. TIT . 12, § 1605; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (civil cases only); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
5.60.060;  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4; WIS. STAT . ANN. § 905.05; WYO. STAT . ANN. § 1-12-104.  
Connecticut and Rhode Island continue to follow a common law privilege for confidential communications, 
notwithstanding that no privilege is expressly set forth by statute.  See State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 
1173 (Conn. 2004); State v. DeSlovers, 100 A. 64, 72 (R.I. 1917).  
199 ARK. R. EVID. 504; N.D. R. EVID. 504; OKLA. STAT . ANN. TIT . 12 § 2504; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-
13.   
200 ALA. R. EVID. 504; DEL. R. EVID. 504; FLA. STAT . § 90.504; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21; HAW. R. EVID. 
505; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504; MINN. STAT . ANN. § 595.02; MISS. R. EVID. 504; N.M. STAT . ANN. § 
38-6-6; N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4502; N.D. R. EVID. 504;  OR. REV. STAT . § 40.255; 42 PA. CONS. STAT . § 
5914;  TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201; TEX. R. EVID. 504(A); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8; VT . STAT . ANN. 
TIT . 12, § 1605; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-
3-4.   
201 AK. R. EVID. 505(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-4062;  ARK. R. EVID. 504; COLO. REV. STAT . § 13-90-
107; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203 ( ); ME. REV. STAT . ANN. TIT . 15, § 1315;  MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 
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assert the confidential communication privilege, unless the statute expressly provides that 
a witness spouse is “presumed” to have authority to assert the privilege on behalf of the 
party spouse absent evidence to the contrary. 202    Kansas takes the position that only the 
communicating spouse can assert the privilege; the recipient of the communication 
cannot assert the privilege where the spouse communicating the information desires that 
it be revealed.203   Finally, a small number of states including Massachusetts protect 
confidential communications through a rule of complete incompetence or 
disqualification; the judge may not allow a witness to reveal a private marital 
communication in court, even if both spouses desire that it be disclosed.204   
 
Of these two common marital privileges, the adverse testimonial privilege is the 
one most commonly raised in domestic violence prosecut ions.  Where the alleged batterer 
and victim are married at the time of trial, the victim might be allowed to assert the 
adverse testimonial privilege and refuse to testify against her accuser at the criminal 
proceeding—even as to facts occurring prior to the marriage. The premise is that forcing 
one spouse to give factual testimony against the other in a criminal case would put an 
unconscionable strain on the marriage.  The result is that victims who reconcile with their 
abusers, or are threatened or intimidated into not testifying, can sometimes invoke the 
adverse testimonial privilege and effectively block the prosecution.  
 
By now most have enacted exceptions to their adverse testimonial privileges for 
crimes committed by one spouse against another, cons istent with the English common 
law rule.205  In these states, the victim/witness has no right to refuse to testify against her 
                                                                                                                                                 
600.2162;  NEV. REV. STAT . § 49.295; OKLA. STAT . ANN. TIT . 12 § 2504; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-13; 
WIS. STAT . ANN. § 905.05.  
202 See, e.g ., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-13; WIS. STAT . ANN. § 905.05.  
203 KAN. STAT . ANN. § 60-428.  McCormick argued that this privilege should be held by the communicating 
spouse.   MCCORMICK, supra  note 140, § 72 at 299. Most state and federal courts have rejected such a 
“communicant” centered approach to the marital confidential communications privilege, recognizing that 
most if not all conversations are two-sided.  See United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citing authorities).  See also  Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 16 (1934) (Supreme Court 
assumed without deciding that absent involvement of stenographer, where husband wrote letter to his wife 
the wife could assert the privilege and refuse to reveal the letter).   
204 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; 725 ILL. COMP . STAT . 5/115-16; IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-46-3-1; IOWA CODE § 
622.9;  MD. CODE ANN., CRT S. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105;  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 20; MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 546.260; NEB. REV. STAT § 27-505;  N.H. R. EVID. 504;  N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57(C); WYO. STAT . 
ANN. § 1-12-104. 
205 See discussion, supra  note 170 and accompanying text.  See also  AK. R. EVID. 505(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT . 
ANN. § 13-4062; CAL. EVID. CODE § 970; COLO. REV. STAT . § 13-90-107;  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
84A; HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3002;  KY. R. EVID. 504;  MD. CODE ANN., CRTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 9-106; MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 600.2162;  MINN. STAT . ANN. § 595.02; NEB. REV. STAT . § 
27-505;  NEV. REV. STAT . 49.295; N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2A:84A -17; N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57; OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2945.42;  OR. REV. STAT . § 40.255; 42 PA. CONS. STAT . § 5913; TEX. R. EVID. 504(B); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-271.2;  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3; WYO. STAT . ANN. 
§ 1-12-104.  In Louisiana, Mississippi, and Utah, although the pertinent adverse testimonial privilege did 
not contain an express spousal crime exception, the courts created one by judicial decision.  See State v. 
Taylor, 642 So.2d 160, 166 (La. 1994); Stubbs v. State, 441 So. 2d 1386 (Miss. 1983); State v. Benson, 712 
P.2d 252 (Ut. 1985).  In Louisiana a court may compel a spouse’s testimony in criminal case where the 
defendant is charged with a crime against the spouse and where there is evidence that the privilege is being 
exercised because of fear, threats or coercion.  Taylor, 642 So.2d at 166.  
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husband in a domestic violence prosecution.206  Where the spousal crime exception 
applies, the adverse testimonial privilege is simply inapplicable.  If the defendant holds 
the adverse testimonial privilege, he may not prevent the victim from testifying, and if the 
victim holds the privilege, she may not refuse to testify.  Remarkably, however, four  
states and the District of Columbia still do not recognize any spousal crime exception to 
the marital adverse testimonial privilege.207  In Alabama, the District of Columbia, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, and Missouri domestic violence cases will be increasingly 
difficult to prove after Crawford unless there are third party witnesses to the battery.   
 
Each of these five jurisdictions should immediately consider amending their 
adverse testimonial privilege statutes to include a spousal crimes exception.  The 
purposes behind the adverse testimonial privilege—to preserve marital harmony and to 
prevent government intrusion on intimate relationships—is simply incompatible with 
situations where one spouse is charged with a crime against the other.   There is very little 
left of marital harmony worth protecting under a utilitarian rationale.208  If one of the 
purposes of the adverse testimonial privilege is to respect societal norms of loyalty,   the 
value of that loyalty should be dependent on the value of its object.209  As a society we 
should be prepared to make a strong statement that marital loyalty is no longer deserving 
of protection when one spouse physically abuses his partner.  In terms of the humanistic 
rationale, while a civilized society may generally not wish to force a spouse to be an 
instrument of their partner’s demise, in circumstances where the witness has sought and 
benefited from the resources of police and the courts, society can reasonably expect her 
to follow through with testimony.  Simply put, it is no more morally repugnant to force a 
witness to testify against a rapist when he is the husband of the victim than when he is a 
total stranger.210  The law should treat these two situations similarly, and in both situation 
vest discretion for the prosecution in the state.  
                                                 
206 Many states have also enacted child abuse exceptions to their marital adverse testimony privileges, 
providing that a spouse witness may not refuse to testify in any criminal proceeding alleging that their 
marital partner abused a child of the relationship.  See Milton C. Regan Jr., Spousal Privilege and the 
Meaning of Marriage, 81 VA . L. REV. 2045, 2052 (1995) (citing jurisdictions).   The application of the 
marital privileges to criminal charges of child abuse is beyond the scope of this article.   
207 ALA. CODE § 12-21-227; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
CH. 233, § 20; MO. ANN. STAT . § 546.260. 
208 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 n.12 (1980).   “It is difficult to reconcile lofty ideals of 
marital harmony and privacy with the dysfunctional and violent relationships depicted in many of the cases 
in which the privileges are raised.”   Frost, supra  note 144, at 3.  Moreover, in instrumental terms placing 
the option of whether or not to testify in the witness’s hands is probably more likely to lead to a strain on 
the marriage than when the option of whether to proceed rests with the government, because in the former 
situation the defendant’s “blame for the testimony is directed at the spouse, with certain disruption of the 
marriage.” Debbie S. Holmes, Marital Privileges in the Criminal Context:  The Need for a Victim Spouse 
Exception in the Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 504, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 1095, 1109.  Creating an 
exception to the marital privilege for domestic violence cases and transferring the power back to the 
prosecutor may free women from pressure, and thus protect them from further threat of physical harm.   
209 See generally Regan, supra  note 206, at 2114.  Because the adverse testimonial privilege operates most 
commonly to preclude wives from testifying against their husbands, we “must confront the issue of whether 
the privilege serves to reinforce a traditional ethic of self-sacrifice for women within marriage.”  Id. at 
2051.   
210 “Those jurisdictions that refuse to give the prosecution the right to compel testimony in domestic 
violence cases the way they can in every other crime send an obvious message:  When a man beats his wife 
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Although less typical, the confidential communications privilege can also be a 
barrier to truth finding in domestic violence cases.  Consider a situation where the 
defendant says to his spouse while he is beating her “I will never let you leave me.  I 
would sooner kill you first.”  In states which recognize the confidential communication 
privilege, even if victim wanted to testify against her batterer as to the facts of the abuse 
she may be prevented by the court from repeating these statements on the witness stand 
upon timely objection of the accused because both spouses generally hold this 
privilege.211  Or imagine a case where a beating occurs and the defendant calls the victim 
up on the telephone days or weeks after the incident, begging for forgiveness and 
promising never to harm the victim again.  In some states the confidential 
communications privilege may prevent the victim from repeating this private 
conversation on the witness stand, notwithstanding that it contains an express admission 
of the accused.212  
 
While most states recognize a spousal crime exception for the confidential 
communications privilege, several do not.  Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia have confidential communications privileges with no 
spousal crimes exception.213  In these five states, a witness may not be allowed to testify 
to a private conversation with their spouse/defendant, even if those conversations occur 
in the context of and/or promote a spousal battery (threats, entreaties, subsequent 
admissions of remorse, promises of improved behavior, etc.).  This omission is 
particularly problematic, because in most states the defendant communicant is one holder 
of this privilege and may prevent his wife from testifying about the private conversation 
even if the wife wishes to reveal it.   It is difficult to justify such a glaring omission on 
public policy grounds. Requiring a domestic violence victim to narrate the facts of abuse 
but preventing her from testifying about conversations with her abuser makes little sense 
when such conversations relate to the very facts which public policy dictates must be 
disclosed.  The five states cited above should rethink the breadth of their marital 
confidential communication privileges and join the mainstream by enacting an express 
spousal crimes exception.  
 
Many states exclude oral threats made by one spouse against another from the 
confidential communications privilege, treating such threats essentially as verbal acts 
rather than private conversations.214  But such a judicial narrowing of the confidential 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is not a crime that offends the state—it us simply a private matter between the two of them.” Seymore,  
supra  note 91, at 1036.  
211 See Commonwealth ex rel Platt v. Platt, 404 A.2d 410 (Pa. Super. 1979) (wife not allowed to testify to 
substance of husband’s threats); Sherry v. Moore, 163 N.E.2d 906, 907 (1928) (statement by husband to 
wife that he “wished she were dead” was properly excluded under disqualification for confidential 
communications).   
212 See State v. Enriquez, 609 A.2d 343, 344 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1992). 
213 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21; N.H. R. EVID. 504; N.C. GEN. STAT . § 8-57(C); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30; 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4. 
214 See, e.g., State v. Parent, 836 So.2d 494, 504 (La. App. 2002) (holding threats are not confidential 
communications); State v. Bryant, 564 N.E.2d 709, 710-11 (Ohio App. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that the 
defendant could not assert privilege to preclude his wife's testimony in kidnapping prosecution based on 
charge that he had taken his wife hostage against her will and threatened her life, even though kidnapping 
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communications privilege does not assure that non-threatening statements made by the 
defendant during or after an incident of domestic violence will be admitted in those states 
that have not enacted a spousal crimes exception.  For example, statements by the 
defendant after his arrest begging his spouse for forgiveness, seeking reconciliation, or 
encouraging her not to press criminal charges are uniquely probative of guilt and helpful 
to the jury in understanding a cycle of abuse; however, they may not be admissible in 
states which have not enacted an express exception to the confidential communication 
privilege for cases alleging an inter-spousal crime. 
 
Recognizing that there is little public interest in protecting such conversations, 
three states have by judicial decision interpreted a spousal crime exception into their 
confidential communication statute even though one was not expressly approved by the 
legislature.215  For example, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the state 
confidential communication privilege does not apply if the communication is not 
“prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty of the marital relationship.”216  This 
New York decision was clearly results oriented.  While some courts may find statements 
made by the defendant during or subsequent to domestic abuse to be outside the privilege 
because not conducive to marital harmony, a more principled basis for allowing 
testimony about such statements is that, although they may have been intended to be kept 
confidential when made, the public interest in disclosing them outweighs the couple’s 
interests in keeping them secret.  This latter rationale involves a balancing of interests 
more appropriately undertaken by state legislatures in enacting spousal crimes exceptions 
to their privilege laws than for the courts in construing statutes otherwise clear on their 
face.217 
  
Even in states that have enacted spousal crime exceptions to both forms of the 
marital privilege, some of these exceptions are worded so narrowly that they do not to 
allow for effective prosecution of domestic violence cases in a post Crawford world.  The 
early common law exception to the martial privileges for crimes against the spouse 
applied only to crimes of violence against the person, such as assault, rape, and attempted 
                                                                                                                                                 
was not specifically listed as the exception under spousal privilege statute, since threats and acts of 
defendant were not "confidential communications" within purpose of statute); Harris v. State, 376 A.2d 
1144 (Md. App. 1977) (holding that threats made by defendant while forcing his wife to reveal to him the 
location of the residence of the victim, with whom the wife had been carrying on a relationship, were not 
within the scope of the confidential communication privilege); Commonwealth v. Gillis, 263 N.E.2d 437, 
439-440 (Mass. 1970) (threat by defendant that he would kil l wife properly admissible). 
215 Iowa v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1986) (overruled on other grounds) (holding in case 
involving prosecution for crime committed against defendant’s spouse, the communication privilege is 
inapplicable);  People v. Mills, 804 N.E.2d 392 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that “[c]ommunication or threats 
made during the course of physical abuse are not entitled to be cloaked in the privilege because the maker 
of the statement is not ‘relying upon any confidential relationship to preserve the secrecy of his acts and 
words.’”); Commonwealth v. McBorrows, 779 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 2001) (communication not privileged 
“if it is not imbued with an aura of a sharing disclosure precipitated largely due to the closeness spouses 
share.”).      
216 Mills, 804 N.E. 2d at 276. 
217 See, e.g., Gillis, 263 N.E.2d at 439-44 (holding that words preceding episode of abuse by eight days--
where wife informed husband that she wanted a divorce and husband responded that he would “kill her” --
were “not reasonably to be regarded as [a] ‘conversation’” within the statutory disqualification). 
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murder.218  A significant number of states still limit the spousal crime exception to crimes 
of violence.219   Gradually the common law exception was expanded in some states to 
include crimes against both the person and the property of the spouse, which may be 
broad enough to include crimes such as arson or burglary but which may not encompass 
crimes such as violation of a restraining order or disturbing the peace.220  Narrowly 
worded spousal crimes exceptions reflect an uninformed view of what constitutes 
intimate partner abuse.   Many instances of domestic abuse involve disturbing the peace, 
disorderly conduct, threats, stalking, forgery or unlawful possession of a firearm.221  To 
avoid dismissal of these cases due to an assertion of privilege by the victim, manipulative 
and controlling criminal behavior not rising to level of a battery or a property crime 
should be included in the spousal crime exception. 222  The most workable formulations 
currently utilized by some states are to exempt from application of the marital privileges 
evidence of any crime “committed by one spouse against the other”223 or, even broader 
yet, any crime “growing out of a personal injury or wrong” to the other spouse.224  Such 
language provides prosecutors the appropriate leeway to craft appropriate charges in 
                                                 
218 Seymore, supra  note 91, at 1051. See Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 283 (Wy. 1960).  
219 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT . ANN. § 54-84a (“personal violence from the other’); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
19-3002  (“in cases of criminal violence upon one by the other”); MD. CODE ANN., CRTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-
106 (assault on other); 42 PA. CONS. STAT . § 5913 (bodily injury or violence caused or threatened); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10.1 (limits exception to crimes of  “assault, sexual assault, or abuse”).   Cf.  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 8-57 (limits exception to assault and trespass charges). 
220 See, e.g., AK. R. EVID. 505(a); KY. R. EVID. 504;  NEB. REV. STAT . § 27-505;  NEV. REV. STAT . 49.295; 
OR. REV. STAT . § 40.255.  See also  State v. Thornton, 119 Wash. 2d 578, 580 (1992) (discussing 
development of exception). 
221 See Seymore, supra  note 82, at 270.      
222 See Renee L. Rold, All States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception Statutes, 55 J. MO. B. 249, 251 
(1999).  For examples of domestic abuse allegations not considered to come within the pertinent state 
spousal crime exception, see Jackson v. State, 603 So.2d 670 (Fla. App. 1992) (holding marital privilege 
applied to wife's testimony that husband, who was charged with murder, called her from jail in attempt to 
get wife to change trial testimony and threatened to do bodily harm to wife, even though threatening 
witness is crime, since husband was not charged with that crime); Creech v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 
650 (Va. 1991) (holding that spousal privilege was violated by defendant’s wife’s testimony that defendant 
had threatened to “torch” her property when she told him she was leaving him, where defendant was not 
charged for any offense against his wife, but was indicted and tried solely for arson of his house);   Ohio 
City of Huron v. Bass No. E-90-29, 1991 WL 137009 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (disorderly conduct not a crime 
against the spouse); State v. Vaughan 118 S.W.2d 1186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909) (disturbing the peace not 
included within spousal crime exception). 
223 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-4062;  CAL. EVID. CODE § 970; HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 595.02; N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2A:84A-17; TEX. R. EVID. 504(B); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
5.60.060 (1); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3; WYO. STAT . ANN. § 1-12-104.  See also  Chamberlain , 348 P.2d 
at 284 (exception worded as “crime committed by one against the other” was broad enough to include 
statutory rape of daughter, because that crime “caused a special wrong to the wife and has particularly and 
directly affected her in a manner other than that suffered by the public in general”).  Cf. State v. Jansen, 108 
P.3d 92, 93 (Or. 2005) (exception phrased as “offense or attempted offense against the person or property 
of the other spouse” broad enough to include crime of interference with making a report, based on 
allegations that defendant prevented his wife from making a 911 call during domestic dispute). 
224 MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 600.2162; See People v. Pohl, 507 N.W.2d 819 (Mich. 1993) (holding wife 
could testify against husband in prosecution for breaking and entering when husband's action interfered 
with wife's right of peaceful habitation, and was part of pattern of hostile behavior, such that it could 
constitute "personal wrong or injury" against wife within an exception to testimonial privilege statute for 
actions growing out of personal wrong or injury done by one to other spouse).   
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domestic violence cases based on the evidence and the probationary status of the accused, 
without concern that the available proof will be unnecessarily constrained by the charges 
selected.225   It also eliminates potential ambiguity and judicial discretion where the 
defendant is charged with multiple counts, only some of which allege violent crimes.226 
  
 Some may argue that spousal crimes exceptions to the marital privileges are 
unworkable and counterproductive.  That is, forcing a victim to testify against her spouse 
will seldom yield any fruitful (and truthful) results, because the witness may simply lie or 
profess a lack of memory to the events in question. 227  But prosecutors have the tools 
necessary to handle such situations when they occur, and use of these tools in many 
circumstances is preferable to dismissal of the case entirely.   For example, the prosecutor 
can have the witness declared hostile and examine her as if on cross examination;228 the 
prosecutor can structure the examination in a way that highlights the witness’s emotional 
and economic dependence on the defendant in order to make the case for psychological 
manipulation; and the prosecutor may be allowed to introduce expert testimony of 
battered women’s syndrome to explain the sudden change of heart.229  Prosecutors can 
also impeach the victim with inconsistent statements made to others (sworn affidavits 
provided to police or casual oral statements made to friends and relatives).230    But most 
importantly, so long as the victim testifies at trial, contemporaneous oral statements made 
by the victim to police officers at the scene are admissible for substantive purposes to 
prove the abuse so long as they satisfy an exception to the state hearsay rule—whether or 
                                                 
225 For example, a prosecutor may choose to charge a misdemeanor count of dis turbing the peace or 
violation of a restraining order if he or she feels that a felony charge of assault and battery is unnecessary to 
secure the custody and control of the defendant or to reflect the gravity of the offense.  
226 A related question is whether a spouse should be compellable to testify in a case growing out of harm 
directed at her, but charging injury to a third party victim.  See, e.g., Young v. State, 603 SW 2d 851, 852 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980)(husband’s act of driving into car containing wife and two others did not fit within 
the spousal crimes exception because the indictment did not allege injury to her); Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (Va. 1979)(spousal crime exception did not apply, and wife could 
refuse to testify, where husband allegedly shot at wife but missed, killing third person). Cf. Michigan v. 
Love, 391 N.W. 2d 738, 754 (Mich. 1986)(wife could not be compelled to testify against husband in 
second degree murder case involving shooting of wife’s lover, where defendant allegedly pistol whipped 
both wife and lover, shot lover, and then kidnapped wife, ruling that the assault on the wife grew out of the 
primary assault on the lover, rather than visa versa), limited by People v. Warren, 615 N.W. 2d 691, 696 
(Mich. 200)(declining to find temporal sequence relevant in determining whether attack on third party and 
attack on spouse grow out of same transaction).  California and several other states have addressed this 
problem by including in their spousal crime exception “crimes against the person or property of a third 
person committed in the course of committing a crime against the person or property of the other spouse.” 
See Cal Evid. Code 972(e)(2). See also   Model Code of Evidence 216 (1942) and Uniform Rule of 
Evidence 28(2)(1974)( (recommending similar language).  Stone and Taylor suggest that the spousal 
crimes exception should apply even if the testimony concerns a crime against another, so long as that crime 
is part of same criminal transaction as the crime against the spouse.   STONE AND TAYLOR, supra  note 126 § 
5.06 at 5-10. 
227 Many domestic violence victims who choose (or are forced) to testify recant once they take the witness 
stand and face their alleged batters.  See Raeder, supra  note 3, at 351.   
228 See FED. R. EVID. 611(c). 
229 Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 637 (1997).  See Lininger, supra  note 2, at 812.   
230 Cross examination with such prior inconsistent statements generally will not be considered to violate the 
hearsay bar because these statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  See FED. R. EVID. 
801(c). 
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not they are considered “testimonial” under Crawford. 231  If the witness is on the stand 
testifying and recants or equivocates, the prosecutor can admit excited utterances made to 
responding officers at or near the time of the event, even if they are testimonial in 
nature.232   
 
  Still others may bristle at the unsettling possibility of jailing a battered woman for 
refusing to testify against her alleged abuser.233  After all, if the prosecutor has the legal 
right to force a victim to testify, the judicial sanction that might be invoked to give effect 
to this right is jailing a witness for contempt of court.234   Concerns about re-traumatizing 
domestic violence victims through contempt proceedings are legitimate,235  if not 
overstated.236   Two states have addressed this problem with novel adjustments to their 
statutes.  For example, in California judges are only allowed to sentence a victim to up to 
72 hours of battering counseling or up to 72 hours of community service for the first 
finding of contempt in a domestic violence prosecution. 237  Only if the victim refuses to 
satisfy this condition, or again refuses to testify at the same proceeding after completing 
the program, may she be jailed her for contempt of court.   In Maryland, a married victim 
in a domestic assault proceeding is required to take the stand and refuse to testify in front 
of the jury.  For the first such refusal, the judge may excuse her from testifying on the 
grounds of the adverse testimonial privilege.238   But if the victim is called to testify at a 
second criminal proceeding against the same spouse, the spousal crime exception kicks in 
and the witness has no privilege not to testify. 239   This novel “two strikes” approach to 
the spousal crimes exception--like California’s contempt statute--essentially assures that 
the witness will not be jailed upon her first refusal to testify.   Each of these creative 
approaches are attempting to send the message that while society may condemn the 
witness’s choice not to testify, we are not going to punish this choice too severely 
because we sympathize with the substantial pressures that may lead to it.   
       
 Enactment of broad spousal crimes exceptions to the marital privileges does not 
mean that prosecutors will always force a victim to testify over her objections.  The true 
value of these exceptions is not in the exercise of the power to compel (which might be 
                                                 
231 “When the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-
60 n. 9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). 
232 Raeder, supra  note 67, at 31.  See People v. Martinez, 2005 WL 78550 (Cal. App. 2005).   
233 Seymore, supra  note 91, at 1072. 
234 See Ohio v. Karnes, 1981 WL 5749 (Ohio App. 1981) (domestic violence victim properly jailed for 
contempt). 
235See  Seymore, supra  note 91, at 1072.  Where the witness is the primary caregiver of children, the 
invocation of contempt sanctions may poses serious issues for child custody and protection. 
236 A study of “no-drop” policies in San Diego found that in a five year period only eight arrest warrants 
were issued for domestic violence victims and only two witnesses were jailed overnight for contempt, out 
of roughly 400-500 domestic violence cases prosecuted monthly.  Rold, supra  note 222, at 251.  A Texas 
Committee on domestic violence found no correlation between states with spousal violence exception to 
the adverse spousal testimonial privileges and the incidence of contempt charges or jail ing of victims.  
Seymore, supra  note 82, at 258. 
237  See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. 1219(c). 
238 MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PRO. 9-106 (a).    
239 Id.  
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used only in situations of last resort) but in the ability to do so.   Prudent prosecutors will 
decide whether to compel a victim’s testimony in domestic violence cases only after 
analyzing the factual nuances and circumstances of each particular case, taking into 
account not only the victim’s wishes, but also the level of risk to the victim and her 
family, the danger to the public, the victim’s mental and emotional stability, and the 
defendant’s prior criminal record.240   The legal capacity to compel testimony in domestic 
violence prosecutions may in fact encourage more guilty pleas, a result which would end 
up being in the best interests of both the victim and the public.241    
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
If the marital privileges were an impediment to domestic violence prosecutions in 
several states prior to the Crawford decision, they are now a major and often 
insurmountable obstacle.  Sometimes a change in one area of the law brings to light a 
need for reform in related areas as well.  State legislatures must wake up and give careful 
scrutiny to the wording and breadth of their marital privilege statutes, many of which are 
antiquated and poorly drafted.   In a post -Crawford world, all domestic violence victims 
should be compellable to testify about the circumstances of their alleged abuse. Enacting 
domestic violence exceptions to both forms of the marital privilege will render more 
victims available to testify—a result that not only ensures defendants an opportunity to 
confront their accusers, but one that is also consonant with the interests of public safety. 
 
Establishing the nature and scope of family privileges should not be a simplistic 
process that automatically favors certain intimate relationships over other societal 
values.242    There are competing interests at stake—respect for and preservation of 
marriage on the one side, and needs of law enforcement and protection of public safety 
on the other.   While policymakers may disagree on where precisely these lines should be 
drawn, most would likely concur that batterers should not be allowed to escape 
punishment for their conduct through disingenuous reliance on statutes designed 
primarily to promote marital peace.  Domestic violence is a crime of control and 
manipulation. 243  The amendments proposed in this article would remove any incentive 
that a defendant may have to blame and/or coerce the testifying spouse, and would place 
the responsibility for domestic violence prosecutions squarely with the state, where it 
belongs.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240 Hanna, supra  note 70, at 1908–09.  See King-Ries, supra  note 81, at 305.    
241 See Seymore, supra  note 91, at 1083. In most cases the defendants will agree to plead guilty because 
they know that with the victim’s testimony the state will be able to proceed, and will likely win.  Seymore, 
supra  note 82, at 252 (quoting study in Houston that fifty percent of domestic violence cases were 
dismissed before a spousal crime exception to the marital privilege was enacted, but seventy percent of 
these cases were disposed thereafter).  
242 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 849 N.E.2d 797, 805 (2006) (interpreting state adverse testimonial privilege 
statute to not apply to grand jury proceedings). 
243 Nelson et al., supra  note 64, at 29.   
